Background
Summer Rae Moomey pleaded guilty to two counts of felony resisting arrest under MCL 750.81d arising from a drunk-driving incident and was sentenced to probation in December 2022. The trial court imposed various fines, costs, and fees at that sentencing, including tether fees, attorney fees, and a probation supervision fee. Alcohol addiction was identified as the central obstacle to Moomey’s rehabilitation, and she underwent both outpatient and inpatient treatment and was placed on an electronic tether.
After a probation violation in December 2023, the trial court extended her probation, sentenced her to one year in jail, and added a no-contact condition barring any verbal, written, electronic, or physical contact with her husband. The condition was grounded in testimony that her husband was not supportive of her sobriety, that alcohol was present in the marital home, and that her relationship with him was linked to her relapses — including one episode in which she was found unresponsive with a blood alcohol level of 0.243 shortly after her tether requirement ended. Moomey herself acknowledged at the hearing that she and her husband were “not healthy for each other.”
Moomey was subsequently arraigned for a second probation violation after calling her husband from jail. She moved to strike the no-contact condition as an unconstitutional infringement on marital privacy, but the trial court denied the motion. She pleaded guilty to the violation and admitted she knew she was violating the order. At the May 2024 resentencing, the court reimposed the original financial obligations ($4,371) and expressly waived a $262.20 late fee — but the amended judgment of sentence nonetheless included that fee. Moomey appealed by leave granted.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions and the trial court’s rulings in full, remanding only on the narrow ministerial question of correcting the judgment of sentence to remove the waived late fee. On the no-contact condition, the court held there was no abuse of discretion. Although the condition was arguably an absolute prohibition on spousal contact for the probation term — unlike the conditional restriction upheld in People v Graber, 128 Mich App 185 (1983) — it was nonetheless rationally related to Moomey’s rehabilitation given the documented causal link between her relationship with her husband and her alcohol relapses. The court also rejected Moomey’s claim that the order was too vague to cover telephone calls, noting that the prohibition on “verbal, written, electronic, or physical contact” plainly encompassed telephone communication and that Moomey herself admitted she knew she was violating it.
On the reimposed financial obligations, the court held there was no plain error. Applying the recently decided People v Goulder, ___ Mich App ___ (2026) (Docket No. 373826), the court confirmed that revocation of probation extinguishes prior monetary obligations but that MCL 769.1k(3) authorizes the trial court to reimpose them at resentencing — provided the court states the complete sentence on the record and either restates the factual basis for fees or expressly indicates it is relying on reasons articulated at the original sentencing. Here the trial court satisfied that standard by stating the total amount owed and expressly referencing its prior sentencing rationale.
The court ordered a limited remand for the ministerial correction of the judgment of sentence to reflect the waived $262.20 late fee, directing that any amounts already collected on account of the error be returned to Moomey. Jurisdiction was not retained.
Key Takeaways
- A no-contact order barring a defendant from communicating with her spouse is a lawful probation condition where the spousal relationship is documented as a cause of recidivism — even if neither spouse requested the restriction and it operates as an effective absolute prohibition for the probation term.
- Under Goulder and MCL 769.1k(3), a trial court resentencing after probation revocation may reimpose original financial assessments without restating the factual basis, so long as it expressly references the rationale it articulated at the original sentencing.
- A clerical discrepancy between an oral pronouncement waiving a fee and a written judgment that includes that fee is an obvious error correctable on remand, even absent a concession by the prosecution.
Why It Matters
The decision illustrates how Michigan courts balance constitutional marital-privacy interests against the broad rehabilitative latitude afforded to sentencing judges under MCL 771.3. Defense practitioners should note that challenges to spousal no-contact conditions face an uphill battle where the record connects the relationship to substance-abuse relapses — even without a victim-requested order of the type validated in Graber.
The opinion also reinforces the procedural framework for reimposing financial penalties after probation revocation under the freshly minted Goulder standard. Trial courts that build a thorough factual record at initial sentencing and then explicitly incorporate that record by reference at resentencing will withstand plain-error review, while courts that impose new or expanded financial obligations without a stated basis remain vulnerable to reversal.