Background
On November 3, 2021, Roger Pineau was driving to work when he used his car’s cigarette lighter to light a cigarette. While attempting to return the lighter to its socket, his vehicle drifted onto rumble strips in the center of the road. The startling contact caused him to fumble and drop the hot lighter into the vehicle’s console, where its coils ignited the wick of a fireworks mortar resting there. Pineau picked up the lit firework to toss it out the window but dropped it, and it exploded in close proximity to him. He lost several fingers on both hands and sustained lasting damage to his eyesight, hearing, and cognitive function.
Pineau filed a claim for personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits under Michigan’s no-fault act, MCL 500.3105(1), with his insurer, State Farm. State Farm denied coverage, arguing his injuries did not arise out of the “ownership, operation, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle” but were instead caused solely by the firework. Complicating matters, statements attributed to Pineau in the police report, State Farm’s claim notes, and hospital records suggested he had intentionally been lighting fireworks to throw out the window — accounts Pineau disputed under oath at deposition and at trial.
Pineau filed suit in Van Buren Circuit Court in September 2022. State Farm moved for summary disposition, arguing no version of the facts established the required nexus between the injuries and vehicular use. The trial court denied that motion, finding Pineau’s sworn deposition testimony raised a genuine issue of material fact. The case proceeded to a jury trial, which in February 2025 returned a verdict for Pineau, awarding PIP benefits and penalty interest for overdue benefits. State Farm appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed on all three issues raised on appeal: the denial of summary disposition, the denial of a directed verdict, and the sufficiency of the jury’s verdict. The court held that Pineau’s sworn deposition and trial testimony — which was consistent throughout — was sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether his injuries arose out of the operation and use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle under MCL 500.3105(1). The conflicting out-of-court statements attributed to Pineau presented a credibility question properly reserved for the jury.
Applying the standard from Thornton v Allstate Ins Co, 425 Mich 643 (1986), and McKenzie v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 458 Mich 214 (1998), the court concluded a reasonable jury could find the causal connection was more than incidental, fortuitous, or merely “but for.” The vehicle hitting the rumble strips was part of the operative chain of events; the use of the car’s cigarette lighter is a normal vehicular function; and Pineau’s inability to simply exit or step away from the imminent explosion — because the vehicle was in motion — rendered the motor vehicle’s operation instrumental to his injuries, not merely their situs.
The court distinguished Yost v League Gen Ins Co, 213 Mich App 183 (1995), where a fire injury in a parked car used as a bed had only a fortuitous connection to vehicular use, and declined to follow the non-binding federal decision in Richland Knox Mut Ins Co v Kallen, 376 F2d 360 (6th Cir. 1967), which predated the no-fault act and involved an intentional act rather than an accidental ignition. The jury’s verdict was affirmed as supported by competent evidence and consistent with a logical interpretation of the facts.
Key Takeaways
- Under MCL 500.3105(1), PIP coverage attaches when the causal connection between the injury and vehicular use is more than incidental, fortuitous, or “but for” — the vehicle need not be the direct physical instrument of harm, but its operation must be instrumental in the chain of events leading to injury.
- A claimant’s sworn deposition testimony that conflicts with out-of-court statements attributed to the claimant creates a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary disposition; courts may not weigh credibility at that stage.
- The fact that a driver cannot evacuate a moving vehicle to escape an imminent hazard is itself a legally cognizable connection to vehicular use — being in an operating vehicle, as opposed to a stationary one, can be what transforms an incidental connection into an instrumental one.
- Michigan’s no-fault act is remedial and must be construed liberally in favor of intended beneficiaries; unusual or unforeseeable factual circumstances do not automatically preclude PIP coverage.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces that the “arising out of use” requirement under Michigan’s no-fault act is a fact-intensive inquiry, and that unusual accident scenarios involving objects inside a vehicle are not categorically excluded from PIP coverage. Insurers cannot defeat coverage simply by characterizing an injury as caused by a non-vehicular object (here, a firework) when the operation of the vehicle itself was a meaningful link in the causal chain — particularly where the moving nature of the vehicle prevented the claimant from escaping harm.
For practitioners, the case underscores the importance of sworn testimony in defeating summary disposition motions when prior inconsistent statements exist. It also highlights that the “instrumentality vs. situs” distinction remains central to MCL 500.3105(1) analysis, and that courts will look carefully at whether being in an operating vehicle — as opposed to a stationary one — meaningfully altered the claimant’s ability to respond to a dangerous condition.