Background
Michael Shaun Moriarty was driving on a dark, rural road in Van Buren County when his Toyota RAV4 struck and killed Todd Mullin, who was at the roadway’s edge with a disabled motorcycle. Mullin wore dark clothing, a black helmet, and retroreflective shoes. Moriarty admitted consuming six or seven beers, and the parties stipulated that his blood alcohol content was 0.18% at the time of the collision.
At trial, the parties’ accident-reconstruction experts disagreed about whether the collision was avoidable. The prosecution’s expert testified that Moriarty could have changed lanes or swerved, while the defense expert opined that even a sober driver could not have perceived and reacted to Mullin in time. The defense also presented evidence that Mullin had alcohol, THC, and methamphetamine in his system, although its toxicology expert could not say whether that impairment contributed to the crash. A jury convicted Moriarty of operating while intoxicated causing death, and the trial court denied his motions for a judgment of acquittal and a new trial.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding that Moriarty’s operation of the vehicle proximately caused Mullin’s death. Viewing the evidence in the prosecution’s favor, a rational jury could find that Mullin’s conduct amounted at most to ordinary negligence—not gross negligence or intentional misconduct that would constitute an unforeseeable superseding cause. The jury was entitled to credit the prosecution expert’s testimony that Moriarty could have swerved and to find it reasonably foreseeable that a rural road would be dark and that a disabled vehicle might be on or near the shoulder.
The court distinguished People v. Feezel because the jury here was permitted to hear and evaluate evidence of the victim’s intoxication; Feezel required submission of relevant evidence to the jury but did not dictate a particular finding on proximate cause. Moriarty waived any appellate challenge to the causation instructions by expressly approving them at trial. The court also held that the verdict was not against the great weight of the evidence because the record reasonably supported the finding of proximate cause and showed no extraneous influence on the jury.
Key Takeaways
- A victim’s intoxication or negligent conduct does not automatically sever proximate causation in an operating-while-intoxicated-causing-death prosecution.
- Whether the victim committed gross negligence amounting to a superseding cause is generally a fact-specific question for the jury.
- Expressly approving jury instructions waives appellate review of alleged errors in those instructions.
Why It Matters
The decision underscores the deferential standards governing sufficiency and great-weight challenges after a jury resolves conflicting expert testimony. When jurors receive evidence concerning a victim’s impairment and conduct, an appellate court will not reweigh that evidence merely because the defense expert offered a different account of causation.
For practitioners, the opinion also clarifies that Feezel guarantees jury consideration of relevant victim-intoxication evidence rather than a defense-favorable conclusion, and it highlights the importance of preserving objections to causation instructions.