Background
The parties were married for approximately 19 years before finalizing their divorce in 2021. Though living separately, they continued to coparent their three children. In April 2025, the petitioner sought an ex parte personal protection order (PPO) against her former husband in Washtenaw Circuit Court under MCL 600.2950, which governs restraining orders against former spouses, and MCL 600.2950a, which covers stalking-related restraining orders.
The petition rested on three incidents. In February 2021, the respondent invited petitioner to his home under the pretense of a surprise and then produced a firearm from his closet, frightening her. In August 2024, respondent entered petitioner’s home without permission while she was away. And in March 2025, a neighbor’s video showed respondent at petitioner’s home at night, where her boyfriend’s truck was found with two slashed tires.
The trial court granted the ex parte PPO. Respondent moved to terminate it, but the trial court denied the motion, finding that petitioner had a reasonable apprehension of violence based on the tire-slashing incident, that respondent’s presentation of a firearm could constitute an implied threat, and that petitioner was justified in being concerned about respondent treating her home as accessible to him. Respondent appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion to terminate the PPO. Reviewing for abuse of discretion, the court found sufficient evidence under MCL 600.2950(1)(l)—which covers conduct causing a “reasonable apprehension of violence”—to support the PPO’s continuation. The court deferred to the trial court’s credibility findings and concluded that the totality of the circumstances, including the tire-slashing incident corroborated by a responding officer and a neighbor’s video, the prior firearm incident, and the unauthorized entry, placed the decision within the range of principled outcomes.
The court also rejected respondent’s argument that petitioner was required to show a “continuity of purpose” or at least two instances of harassing or threatening conduct. The court clarified that those are elements of stalking and aggravated stalking under MCL 750.411h and MCL 750.411i, and do not apply to all conduct covered by MCL 600.2950(1). Under MCL 600.2950(1)(l), no such showing is required. Because the PPO was properly sustained on that ground, the court declined to address the trial court’s other stated bases for denial.
The court further rejected respondent’s contention that the standard for reasonable cause requires “objective” evidence, finding no legal support for that characterization. The court noted that while a prior case, Pickering v Pickering, 253 Mich App 694 (2002), had upheld a PPO where objective evidence was present, that case did not establish objective evidence as a universal prerequisite.
Key Takeaways
- Under MCL 600.2950(1)(l), a single incident causing a reasonable apprehension of violence is sufficient to support a PPO; petitioners are not required to demonstrate a pattern of conduct or “continuity of purpose” unless proceeding solely under a stalking theory.
- Michigan courts evaluate PPO reasonable-cause determinations based on the totality of the circumstances, and appellate courts defer to trial court credibility findings when reviewing motions to terminate.
- There is no legal requirement that a PPO petitioner produce “objective” evidence of reasonable cause; corroborated testimony and video identification can suffice.
- The stalking elements of MCL 750.411h and MCL 750.411i — including the continuity-of-purpose requirement — do not import into the broader reasonable-apprehension-of-violence provision of MCL 600.2950(1)(l).
Why It Matters
This decision offers practical clarity to family law practitioners on the scope of Michigan’s PPO statute. Respondents in PPO termination proceedings sometimes conflate the stalking sub-provisions of MCL 600.2950 with its catchall provision covering reasonable apprehension of violence. The court’s holding confirms that those stalking-specific requirements — particularly the need to show a pattern or continuity of purpose — are limited to the stalking grounds and cannot be grafted onto MCL 600.2950(1)(l).
For petitioners, the case reinforces that a single well-documented incident, particularly one involving a weapon and corroborating video evidence, can sustain a PPO against a former spouse. The ruling also signals that courts will not impose a heightened evidentiary threshold — such as a demand for “objective” proof — beyond what the statute itself requires, preserving the accessibility of protective relief in domestic situations where direct evidence may be limited.