Background
Oakland County law enforcement executed a search warrant at Darren Simpson’s apartment and recovered a kilogram of cocaine, multiple firearms, and $20,000 in cash. While jailed, Simpson agreed to cooperate and told Detective Ruben Garcia he could arrange purchases of large quantities of cocaine. With Garcia’s permission, Simpson used his collected cell phone to call a man he knew as “Joe,” recorded conversations in which they negotiated the purchase of 10 kilograms of cocaine at $29,000 per kilogram. Officers surveilled the planned handoff and arrested all parties when a courier arrived with a backpack containing ten packages that tested positive for cocaine.
The man Simpson knew as “Joe” was identified as defendant Hong Yuan Li. Li admitted to officers that he was present as a “middleman” for security, earning $5,000, but denied knowing Simpson. A search of Li’s car turned up a handgun, ammunition, and multiple cell phones. One phone contained call records and messages with Simpson, photographs of Simpson “cooking up crack,” images of drug-trafficking paraphernalia, and messages from the courier stating he was “10 minutes” away and had arrived.
A jury in Oakland Circuit Court convicted Li of conspiring to deliver 1,000 grams or more of cocaine (MCL 750.157a; MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(i)), felony-firearm (MCL 750.227b), and carrying a concealed weapon (MCL 750.227). As a second-offense habitual offender, he was sentenced to eleven to twenty years for conspiracy, a consecutive two years for felony-firearm, and two to seven-and-a-half years for carrying a concealed weapon. Li appealed by right.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeals affirmed all convictions. On the Confrontation Clause claims, the court held that Simpson’s out-of-court statements about his prior cocaine acquisition and ability to order large quantities were admitted not for their truth but to explain why Detective Garcia permitted Simpson to make recorded calls from jail — a classic “effect on the hearer” non-hearsay purpose. Because the statements were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, they did not implicate the Confrontation Clauses of the U.S. or Michigan Constitutions. As to Garcia’s testimony linking a specific phone number to Li, the court found no plain error because a bare telephone number does not constitute an “assertion” under MRE 801(a), and Garcia had independent personal knowledge of the number from his own investigation pursuant to a search warrant.
On the MRE 403 challenge, the court found the issue forfeited because Li failed to raise it below and his appellate brief neither acknowledged that failure nor developed an argument meeting the plain-error standard. Independently, the court concluded MRE 403 would not apply: Simpson’s statements were both highly probative of the conspiracy and not unfairly prejudicial, since they explained law enforcement’s investigative conduct and were corroborated by Li’s own admissions and the electronic evidence recovered from his phone. The court distinguished People v. Wilkins, 408 Mich 69 (1980), noting that case involved actual hearsay that was irrelevant and directly pointed to the defendant’s guilt — none of which was true here.
Because Li failed to establish any error, let alone one satisfying the heightened plain-error standard on unpreserved claims, the court found no basis for a new trial and affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
Key Takeaways
- Out-of-court statements offered to explain why law enforcement took subsequent investigative steps — not to prove the truth of what was said — are non-hearsay and do not trigger Confrontation Clause protections under Crawford v. Washington and Michigan’s People v. Washington.
- A raw telephone number is not an “assertion” within the meaning of MRE 801(a) and therefore is not hearsay; a detective’s testimony that a number recovered via search warrant matched a number previously called does not require the Confrontation Clause analysis applicable to contact-list names.
- Failure to object at trial on the specific grounds raised on appeal limits review to the demanding plain-error standard, and appellate briefs must affirmatively acknowledge and address any lack of preservation or risk outright forfeiture of the issue.
- MRE 403 bars only unfairly prejudicial evidence; evidence that is damaging but probative and consistent with the overall proof at trial does not meet that threshold.
Why It Matters
This decision illustrates how prosecutors can use a cooperating witness’s out-of-court statements through a law-enforcement handler without triggering hearsay or Confrontation Clause bars, so long as the statements are framed — and actually offered — to explain investigative conduct rather than to prove the underlying facts. Defense counsel must be alert to this framing at trial and object on the specific grounds they intend to raise on appeal, because the plain-error filter on unpreserved claims is a nearly insurmountable barrier in Michigan appellate practice.
The court’s footnote clarifying that Michigan’s Supreme Court has “soundly rejected” the “primary purpose” test outside the emergency context (following People v. Washington, 514 Mich 583 (2024)) is also notable: Michigan courts assess whether a statement is “testimonial” by asking whether an objective witness would have expected it to be used at trial, not by examining the interrogating officer’s primary purpose. Practitioners handling cases involving jail-cell cooperation or controlled buys should calibrate their evidentiary arguments accordingly.