Background
On January 22, 2024, Trisha Lynn Peterson and co-defendant Robert Taylor drove to Get ‘er Clean Car Wash in Glendive, Montana and used a sledgehammer and prybar to break into one of the business’s dog-wash machines, forcing the door open, destroying the lock and hinges, damaging the electronics, and ripping out the bill acceptor. The machine’s owner, Jeffery Guetter, had purchased it new in 2020 for approximately $17,000. Police executing a search warrant on Peterson’s truck found prybars, hammers, screwdrivers, and numerous vending-machine keys. The State charged Peterson with felony theft by accountability, felony criminal mischief, and misdemeanor possession of a burglary tool.
In June 2024, Peterson pleaded guilty to the two felony counts and agreed to pay all restitution to Get ‘er Clean Car Wash. Prior to sentencing, Guetter submitted an affidavit attesting to a total pecuniary loss of $23,950—the cost of a new dog-wash machine from the original manufacturer, All Paws Pet Wash, including add-ons. At the October 2024 restitution and sentencing hearing, Guetter testified that he had spent thirty to forty hours attempting repairs, replaced switches, electronics, and the door hinges and lock, yet the machine remained inoperable sixty to seventy percent of the time. He further testified that All Paws informed him the damaged model was no longer manufactured and that purchasing a new comparable 2024 model at $21,050 would be cheaper than attempting piecemeal parts replacement. The Seventh Judicial District Court ordered Peterson to pay restitution jointly and severally with Taylor in the amount of $21,050.
Peterson appealed, arguing that the court should have ordered the lesser of repair cost or pre-damage market value rather than the price of a new machine, that Guetter failed to reasonably mitigate his damages, and that the restitution amount was unjust given her limited ability to pay.
The Court’s Holding
The Montana Supreme Court affirmed in a 4-1 decision authored by Justice Beth Baker. The Court held that § 46-18-243(1)(b), MCA—added by the Legislature in 2003 specifically to supersede prior caselaw limiting restitution to market value—authorizes a sentencing court to order “the full replacement cost of property taken, destroyed, harmed, or otherwise devalued as a result of the offender’s criminal conduct.” That statutory language does not tether the restitution award to fair market value or civil tort diminution-in-value standards. The Court emphasized that when a defendant claims the damaged property could be replaced at a lower cost, the burden falls on the defendant to present contrary evidence; Peterson offered none.
On the mitigation issue, the Court found substantial evidence supported the District Court’s conclusion that Guetter went “above and beyond” reasonable efforts to repair the machine before concluding that full replacement was necessary. Guetter’s thirty to forty hours of repair attempts, his parts orders, his consultation with the manufacturer, and All Paws’s advice that piecemeal repair was impractical all supported the finding that his decision to pursue replacement was the conduct of an ordinarily prudent person. Peterson’s speculation that a welder, electrician, or specialty repair technician might have fixed the machine more cheaply—without any record evidence to that effect—was insufficient to defeat the substantial evidence standard.
On the ability-to-pay claim, the Court reiterated that district courts are not required to consider ability to pay when imposing restitution. The burden rests on the offender to factually demonstrate that payment would be unjust. Because Peterson did not testify at the sentencing hearing, did not present evidence of her expenses, and offered no showing comparable to the debilitating mental health and financial circumstances that supported waiver in State v. Lodahl, she failed to meet that burden.
Key Takeaways
- Under § 46-18-243(1)(b), MCA, Montana criminal restitution for damaged or destroyed property is measured by “full replacement cost,” not market value or repair cost—the 2003 legislative amendment expressly displaced the prior market-value rule from State v. Pritchett.
- When a defendant contends that the true replacement cost is lower than the victim’s evidence shows, the defendant must introduce contrary evidence at the restitution hearing; cross-examination and speculation alone are insufficient to defeat the substantial-evidence standard.
- A victim’s testimony and affidavit, without receipts or formal appraisals, can constitute substantial evidence sufficient to support a restitution award, provided it is not based on pure assumption or speculation.
- An offender seeking to reduce or waive restitution on ability-to-pay grounds must affirmatively develop the factual record at sentencing; failure to testify or present financial evidence forfeits that argument on appeal.
- Justice Gustafson dissented, arguing that awarding the full price of a brand-new 2024 machine to replace a four-year-old used machine constitutes a windfall that misreads the replacement-cost statute.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces that Montana’s 2003 restitution amendments give sentencing courts broad authority to make crime victims financially whole by ordering the actual cost to replace damaged property—even when that means paying for a newer model because the original is no longer manufactured. Defense practitioners in Montana must come to restitution hearings prepared with affirmative evidence of lower repair costs, used-market values, or depreciation figures; objections to the victim’s evidence, without counter-evidence, will not suffice.
The case also draws a clear procedural line on ability-to-pay challenges: bare assertions that a restitution amount seems large relative to a defendant’s income are not enough. Defendants who wish to invoke the “unjust to require payment” standard of § 46-18-246, MCA must build a detailed factual record—income, expenses, dependents, health, and earning capacity—at the sentencing stage, or the argument is waived. The dissent signals ongoing doctrinal tension over whether “full replacement cost” can justify awarding a new asset in place of a used one, a question that may recur in future cases involving older property.