Background
In June 2024, Ruth Laura Edlund submitted a citizen-initiative petition to Treasure County, Montana seeking voter approval of a proposed county ordinance to establish a permitting process for wind energy conversion systems (WECS). The ordinance was sweeping in scope: it would have regulated setbacks, sound, ice-throw, shadow-flicker, wildlife impacts, site abandonment, and liability insurance, and would have empowered the Board of County Commissioners to approve or deny WECS permits. It also imposed a $10,000-per-day fine for non-compliance. The ordinance purported to rest on the County’s general powers under Title 7, Chapter 5 of the Montana Code Annotated.
The County approved the petition as to form but promptly filed a declaratory judgment action under § 7-5-135, MCA, challenging whether the proposed ordinance would be valid and constitutional if enacted. The County argued the ordinance unlawfully invoked general county authority where the Legislature had already specifically prescribed county land-use and zoning authority in Title 76, Chapter 2, MCA. After discovery and briefing, the Sixteenth Judicial District Court granted summary judgment to the County on invalidity grounds without reaching the constitutional question. Edlund, self-represented, appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The Montana Supreme Court affirmed on a narrow ground. Writing for the Court, Justice Bidegaray held that Edlund’s proposed ordinance — which created a detailed countywide WECS land-use permitting, enforcement, penalty, and decommissioning regime — invoked the County’s general powers under § 7-5-2101, MCA. Those general powers, however, apply only “where no other provision is made by law” and are subject to “limitations and restrictions as are prescribed by law.” Because the Legislature specifically prescribed county authority over land-use and zoning regulation in Title 76, Chapter 2, MCA, the general powers of Title 7, Chapter 5 did not supply valid authority for the ordinance. Under Montana’s canon that specific statutory provisions control over general ones, Title 76, Chapter 2 governed.
The Court also rejected Edlund’s argument that the citizen-initiative power was being improperly curtailed. Section 7-5-131(1), MCA, allows local electors to propose only ordinances “within the legislative jurisdiction and power of the governing body.” Because the Board of County Commissioners lacked authority under either its general powers or the specific zoning statutes to enact this particular ordinance as drafted — including because the $10,000-per-day penalty conflicted with the $500 statutory maximum, and the permitting and appeal structures deviated from those prescribed by Title 76, Chapter 2 — the proposed ordinance fell outside permissible initiative subject matter. The Court expressly declined to hold that citizen initiatives may never address land use; it held only that this ordinance, as drafted, could not proceed.
Key Takeaways
- A citizen-initiated county ordinance must rest on valid statutory authority; invoking a county’s general powers under § 7-5-2101, MCA does not suffice when the Legislature has specifically addressed the subject matter elsewhere — here, in Title 76, Chapter 2’s land-use and zoning statutes.
- The citizen-initiative power in § 7-5-131(1), MCA is limited to measures “within the legislative jurisdiction and power of the governing body”; an initiative cannot confer substantive authority on a local government that the Legislature has not granted.
- The holding is narrow: the Court did not categorically bar land-use citizen initiatives; it invalidated only this specific ordinance because its permitting, penalty, and appeal provisions exceeded or conflicted with existing statutory frameworks under Title 76, Chapter 2.
- Under Montana’s canon of statutory construction, specific statutory provisions (Title 76, Chapter 2 zoning authority) control over general ones (Title 7, Chapter 5 general county powers) when they conflict.
Why It Matters
This decision clarifies an important boundary for Montana county-level citizen initiatives: local electors cannot use the initiative process to create a regulatory scheme that the governing body itself would have no authority to enact under existing law. For wind energy developers and opponents alike, the case signals that county-level WECS regulation must be pursued through the specific statutory pathways — citizen-initiated or county-initiated zoning under Title 76, Chapter 2 — rather than through freestanding general-authority ordinances.
Notably, the 2025 Montana Legislature repealed §§ 7-5-132 through -135, MCA and enacted new procedures under Title 13, Chapter 28. While those changes did not govern this appeal, future § 7-5-135-type validity challenges will now proceed under the new framework, making this one of the final Supreme Court decisions interpreting the prior citizen-initiative challenge statute. The Court’s substantive analysis of the interplay between general county powers and specific land-use authority remains instructive regardless of the procedural vehicle.