Background
The parties in this case share four minor children and a ten-year prior dating relationship. On December 6, 2024, plaintiff C.W. obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO) against defendant M.S. under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35, based on an allegation of harassment. The core incident occurred on September 29, 2024, during a custody exchange in a store parking lot. Plaintiff alleged that defendant used his vehicle to block her from leaving, attempted to open her locked car doors, shouted at her through the window and called her derogatory names, and then followed her vehicle at high speed before pulling alongside her and shouting again at a red light.
Plaintiff also alleged prior incidents of domestic violence, including defendant throwing household items at her while she was pregnant in 2017, kicking her in the back in 2016, and making false reports to child protective services. She further complained that on November 30, 2024, defendant sent his girlfriend to surveil her at her place of business, and that the girlfriend sent her hostile text messages. Both parties were self-represented at the final restraining order (FRO) hearing in the Family Part, Camden County. Defendant denied screaming at plaintiff, offered a different account of the September 29 events, and sought to introduce an email from plaintiff that he believed contained a threat. The trial court denied admission of the email as irrelevant without affording defendant an opportunity to explain its relevance.
Following the parties’ testimony, the trial court rendered a brief oral decision finding that defendant had “horribly harassed” plaintiff and that plaintiff feared defendant, and entered the FRO. Defendant appealed, arguing the trial court failed to make adequate credibility findings, did not identify the applicable subsection of the harassment statute, and made insufficient findings regarding the necessity of an FRO.
The Court’s Holding
The Appellate Division vacated the FRO and remanded for a new trial before a different judge. The panel agreed with defendant that the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law were insufficient to permit meaningful appellate review. While the court found harassment had occurred, it did so without any meaningful discussion of the parties’ testimony, without applying the facts to the relevant statutory provisions, and without identifying which subsection of the harassment statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a), (b), or (c), formed the basis of its finding. Critically, the court made no findings as to whether defendant acted with a “purpose to harass,” which is an essential element under the statute.
The court also failed to address the second Silver prong — whether an FRO was necessary to protect plaintiff from immediate danger or prevent further abuse — with reference to the factors set out in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(1)-(7). And although it implicitly credited plaintiff’s account by finding defendant “horribly harassed” her, the court made no credibility findings whatsoever and failed to address or explain its rejection of defendant’s competing version of events. These omissions, the panel concluded, constituted legal error requiring vacatur. Additionally, the evidentiary ruling excluding the September 29 email without affording defendant an opportunity to explain its relevance was identified as an inadequate record of a ruling that could affect the outcome on remand.
Key Takeaways
- A trial court adjudicating a PDVA FRO must make explicit credibility findings, identify the specific subsection of the harassment statute upon which it relies, and make findings regarding whether the defendant acted with a purpose to harass — the absence of these findings is reversible error.
- Even when the court credits a plaintiff’s account and finds harassment occurred, it must separately address the Silver two-prong test and analyze the N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(1)-(7) factors to support the necessity of an FRO.
- Where a trial court has expressed an opinion on the outcome but made inadequate factual findings, Rule 1:12-1(d) requires reassignment to a different judge on remand; the Appellate Division’s opinion is not an expression of whether an FRO should ultimately issue.
Why It Matters
This decision is a significant procedural reminder for Family Part practitioners and judges handling domestic violence matters. The PDVA creates vital protections for victims, but those protections are sustainable on appeal only when supported by a thorough, well-reasoned trial court decision. Attorneys representing plaintiffs seeking FROs should ensure the record is developed sufficiently to support the necessary findings, including testimony directed specifically at the defendant’s purpose and the statutory factors bearing on the necessity of a restraining order. Defense counsel should be alert to the need to preserve challenges to incomplete findings where the trial court’s reasoning is unclear.
From a practical standpoint, this case illustrates that brevity in oral decisions can be costly. A court that simply announces a conclusion without walking through the two-step Silver analysis and making explicit credibility determinations risks having its order vacated regardless of the underlying merits. Both advocates and the bench would benefit from recognizing that detailed findings are not mere formality — they are what allow appellate courts to give due deference to Family Part decisions rather than reverse them.