Background
The plaintiffs filed a note of issue on April 8, 2024, starting CPLR 3212(a)’s 120-day period for summary-judgment motions. New York City defendants timely served their original motion on July 26. Supreme Court later denied it without prejudice so the case could be converted to electronic filing.
The conversion directive was filed January 8, 2025, and conversion was completed January 15. Those dates were beyond the original deadline, but that portion of the delay resulted from the court’s administration rather than the defendants. The City nevertheless waited until March 17—another 62 days—to electronically file the renewed motion. Supreme Court denied it as untimely.
The Court’s Holding
The First Department unanimously affirmed under CPLR 3212(a) and the Court of Appeals’ strict Brill rule. A court may consider an untimely summary-judgment motion only on a showing of good cause for the delay. Merits, lack of prejudice, and the importance of the defenses do not independently excuse noncompliance.
The court-caused need to convert the action explained why the motion could not simply remain pending through the original schedule. It did not explain the additional two months after conversion was complete. Because the City offered no reason for that interval, it failed to establish good cause.
The original timely service did not transform the later filing into a harmless procedural irregularity. The first motion had been denied, leaving no timely motion pending. Once the obstacle was removed, defendants were obligated to refile diligently or document why they could not. The panel therefore declined to reach the merits.
Key Takeaways
- A timely motion that is denied without prejudice does not permanently preserve CPLR 3212 timeliness for a later motion.
- Court-caused delay may establish good cause only for the period actually attributable to the court.
- Counsel should refile immediately after electronic conversion and document every remaining impediment.
Why It Matters
The decision is a concrete calendar warning for New York litigators. Administrative transitions, reassignment, conversion, and rejected filings can explain part of a delay, but each unexplained interval remains exposed under Brill.
Firms should create a new internal deadline when a motion is denied without prejudice and preserve docket notices and communications showing why refiling could not occur sooner. Parties opposing a late motion should analyze the entire chronology rather than accept a general reference to court administration.
New York’s approach differs from jurisdictions that routinely forgive late dispositive motions based on lack of prejudice. Brill treats the deadline as a case-management rule with institutional consequences: allowing merits review without good cause would reward noncompliance and undermine trial calendars. A stipulation between parties also may not be enough if it conflicts with a court-ordered deadline, so counsel should seek an extension before time expires whenever practicable.
When a clerk rejects or a judge denies a filing for a curable reason, counsel should preserve the proposed motion, rejection notice, conversion order, and proof of the first available refiling date. An affirmation should account for the chronology day by day rather than rely on a conclusory assertion that the delay was administrative. Here, the unexplained 62-day gap—not the conversion itself—was fatal, and the City lost any opportunity for pretrial merits review.