Background
M.P. alleged that she met William Cosby in 1987 after he invited her to the set of The Cosby Show and said the program might hire her to appear and sing in an episode. She alleged that on multiple occasions through 1990 Cosby gave her beverages that caused her to lose consciousness and then sexually assaulted her. The alleged assaults did not occur at the studio.
The complaint asserted negligent hiring, retention, and supervision against The Carsey-Werner Company, which produced the show and allegedly controlled its set. M.P. alleged that the company knew or should have known of Cosby’s propensity to mistreat and assault women and that its premises, personnel, and the prospect of television work helped him cultivate trust and access.
Supreme Court refused to dismiss that claim before discovery. The appeal followed a recent First Department decision, B.B. v. Cosby, rejecting a similar claim where the plaintiff had not visited the studio or used company resources. M.P. argued that her studio visit supplied the missing connection.
The Court’s Holding
A divided First Department reversed and dismissed the claim against Carsey-Werner. Under Court of Appeals precedent, negligent supervision requires allegations that the employer knew of the employee’s propensity, had the ability and occasion to control the employee, and that the employee committed tortious conduct on the employer’s premises or by using resources available only through employment.
The majority held that one studio visit did not create the required nexus. No company employee other than Cosby allegedly met M.P.; the company was not alleged to know she existed; and no assault, touching, or independently tortious conduct occurred on company premises. Cosby’s alleged use of the set and celebrity status to impress or bait M.P. was not the same as using company property as the situs or instrument of a tort.
The majority distinguished cases in which an employee used company email, documents, confidential information, or the workplace itself to perpetrate wrongdoing. It read B.B. to reject abstract authority and influence, standing alone, as employer property or resources. The nature of the workplace contact—not simply whether a visit occurred—controlled.
Justices Gesmer and Kennedy dissented. They would have allowed discovery, reasoning that the complaint alleged Cosby used the set and a purported job opportunity to groom M.P. The dissent viewed those employer-provided resources as analogous to corporate documents and credentials used to lend legitimacy to fraud, and emphasized that notice information would largely be in the producer’s possession.
Key Takeaways
- A workplace visit alone does not plead negligent supervision when no tort occurs there and the employee does not use tangible employer resources to commit the later harm.
- The required nexus turns on how the premises or resources facilitated the tort, not simply on an employee’s prestige or apparent authority.
- The dissent would apply a broader, pleading-stage conception of employer resources where a job prospect and controlled premises allegedly enabled grooming.
Why It Matters
The ruling narrows employer exposure in New York for intentional misconduct occurring away from work. Employers are not automatically liable because employment supplied status, credibility, or an occasion to meet. Complaints must connect the harm to premises, tools, information, personnel, or another resource that the employer could meaningfully control.
The 3-2 split also makes the issue important for appellate and workplace counsel. Organizations should not read the decision as eliminating risk where warning signs exist. Clear visitor rules, supervision of auditions and recruiting contacts, reporting channels, and controls on use of company facilities remain important. Plaintiffs, meanwhile, should plead the precise employer resource used, the employer’s notice, and the causal route from that resource to the injury.
At the pleading stage, the majority’s insistence on an independently tortious act or direct use of a tangible resource may become the focus of future motions. Counsel should separate allegations about celebrity, reputation, and access from allegations about company-controlled spaces, communications, personnel, or job opportunities. The dissent shows that reasonable judges may characterize the same facts differently when an employee allegedly uses a workplace setting to build trust before later misconduct.