- Court
- New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department
- Case
- People v. Ingram
- Date
- May 28, 2026
- Slip Op. No.
- 2026 NY Slip Op 03369
Background
Defendant Jamel Ingram pleaded guilty to attempted murder in the second degree and was sentenced as a second violent felony offender to thirteen years. Ingram subsequently moved to set aside the sentence pursuant to CPL 440.20, arguing that under the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Erlinger v. United States, 602 US 821 (2024), he was entitled to a jury determination regarding whether tolling for prior periods of incarceration brought his predicate violent felony conviction within the ten-year lookback period provided for in Penal Law section 70.04(1)(b)(iv) and (v). The Supreme Court, New York County, denied the motion. Ingram appealed both the conviction and the denial of the CPL 440.20 motion.
Holding
The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed both the conviction and the denial of the CPL 440.20 motion. The Court held that Ingram waived his Erlinger argument by freely admitting to the tolling periods set forth in the second violent felony offender statement, citing People v. Gomez, 236 AD3d 603 (1st Dept 2025). The Court further noted that the Erlinger argument has been rejected in subsequent cases addressing whether the Sixth Amendment requires a jury finding on predicate felony tolling periods under New York’s sentencing framework.
Takeaways
A defendant who freely admits to the tolling periods set forth in a predicate felony offender statement waives any argument that those periods must be determined by a jury under Erlinger. The First Department has consistently held that the Erlinger decision, which addressed the federal Armed Career Criminal Act, does not require jury findings on predicate felony tolling under New York’s sentencing scheme. Defense attorneys seeking to preserve Erlinger-based challenges must object to the tolling periods at sentencing rather than admitting to them.
Why It Matters
This decision is significant for criminal defense practitioners who have been exploring whether the Supreme Court’s Erlinger decision creates new grounds for challenging predicate felony offender sentencing in New York. The First Department’s consistent rejection of Erlinger arguments in the state sentencing context, combined with the waiver doctrine applied to defendants who admit to tolling periods, substantially limits the utility of this federal precedent in New York post-conviction proceedings. Defense attorneys should preserve objections to tolling findings at sentencing if they wish to raise Erlinger-based challenges on appeal.