Background
Lance Dickinson pleaded guilty to murdering his former partner, Cheri-Lee Bell, on 20 June 2025 and to five breaches of a protection order made for her benefit, one of which was a representative charge covering thousands of electronic contacts. Their relationship had ended in April 2025 after escalating family-harm incidents. Despite the protection order, bail conditions, and Bell’s repeated requests that he leave her alone, Dickinson continued contacting her, appeared at her workplace and homes, and threatened to stab and kill her.
On the morning of the murder, Dickinson entered Bell’s Tūrangi home unannounced, hid in the kitchen, argued with her, held her by the hair, and stabbed her 13 times. A 10-centimetre wound to her neck severed major structures and caused fatal blood loss. Bell’s teenage sister and four-year-old child were in the house. Dickinson fled to Taumarunui; the knife was never recovered, leaving unresolved whether he brought it or obtained it at the home.
The High Court sentenced Dickinson after considering victim-impact statements, a pre-sentence report assessing a high risk of reoffending and harm, and a psychiatrist’s report. The probation officer viewed the killing as calculated and premeditated, while the Court found an indeterminate but significant degree of premeditation.
The Court’s Holding
Jagose J held that life imprisonment for the murder was not manifestly unjust. The case did not possess the exceptional circumstances required to displace the statutory presumption of a life sentence. The Court identified at least nine aggravating features, including unlawful entry, use of a weapon, an attack to the neck, particular cruelty and brutality, offending while on bail, family violence against a protected person, and the prolonged fear and distress caused to Bell. It found no mitigating feature in the attack itself.
The murder engaged the statutory requirement for a minimum term of at least 17 years because it involved, among other things, brutality, vulnerability, prior threats, and offending against a protected person. Using comparable fatal family-violence cases, the Court selected a 19-year starting point and reduced it by two years for Dickinson’s guilty plea. It rejected any further reduction for personal background because the evidence did not establish impaired choice or diminished moral culpability.
The Court therefore sentenced Dickinson to life imprisonment with a minimum period of imprisonment of 17 years. For the five protection-order breaches, it imposed an aggregate sentence of six years and nine months after guilty-plea credit, to run concurrently with the life sentence. The Court also issued Dickinson a first warning under the three-strikes law.
Key Takeaways
- Life imprisonment remained mandatory because neither the circumstances of the murder nor Dickinson’s personal circumstances made that sentence manifestly unjust.
- The brutal killing of a person whom a protection order was intended to protect justified application of the statutory 17-year minimum-term regime.
- A 19-year starting point was reduced by two years for the guilty plea, producing a 17-year minimum period before Dickinson may be considered for parole.
- The five protection-order breaches included one representative charge; their concurrent sentence was six years and nine months.
Why It Matters
The decision illustrates the sentencing consequences when escalating family violence culminates in the murder of a protected person. A defendant’s deliberate disregard of protection orders and bail conditions can support strong denunciatory and deterrent treatment, particularly where the victim is attacked in her own home.
It also clarifies that eligibility for parole after the minimum term does not guarantee release. Dickinson may be released only if the Parole Board is satisfied that he would not pose an undue risk to community safety, and any release would remain subject to conditions for life.