Background
P. S., a Georgian former soldier, sought international protection in Ireland. He said he faced a risk of assault, kidnapping or death in Georgia because of his alleged involvement in the 2012 Lopota Valley operation and later incidents involving Russian or Chechen actors. His initial protection claim was refused by the International Protection Office and, following an oral hearing, by the International Protection Appeals Tribunal.
After producing material concerning an alleged assault on his brother in 2024, P. S. was permitted to make a further protection application. That application was also refused. His application to extend time to appeal that decision to the Tribunal was refused, and the Minister made a deportation order. The High Court dismissed his judicial review challenge. Pending his appeal from that dismissal, P. S. sought an interlocutory injunction preventing deportation to Georgia.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal refused the injunction. Applying the principles in Okunade v Minister for Justice, it accepted that P. S. had an arguable appeal because related challenges to the appeal-time-limit regulation were awaiting determination by the Court of Appeal. But that was not enough to displace the default position that apparently valid immigration decisions should be implemented pending appeal.
P. S. had not established a credible basis for a real risk of significant harm in Georgia. Georgia was a designated safe country of origin, and his evidence of targeting, surveillance and attempted kidnapping was sparse, vague, inconsistent and speculative. The Court also rejected the submission that deportation would make any later Tribunal appeal futile: if he ultimately succeeded, the Tribunal and Minister were to be assumed to act lawfully, including by considering an appeal remotely and revoking a deportation order if protection were granted.
Key Takeaways
- An arguable appeal does not itself justify an injunction against deportation.
- An applicant must show credible, individualized evidence of a real risk of significant harm to overcome the usual rule favouring implementation of immigration decisions.
- Deportation does not necessarily render a future international-protection appeal futile where it can be pursued lawfully from abroad.
Why It Matters
The decision confirms the demanding Okunade threshold for stopping deportation pending an appeal. Even where a procedural challenge may be arguable, the applicant must show concrete evidence of exceptional personal prejudice or irremediable harm.
It also underscores that courts will not assume that immigration authorities will fail to give effect to a successful later protection claim merely because the applicant has been removed from the State.