Background
Robert Drake and Tamara Drake were parties to a divorce proceeding in the District Court of Barnes County, Southeast Judicial District, before the Honorable Jay A. Schmitz. The parties entered into a stipulated marital property distribution agreement, which the district court adopted as part of the divorce judgment.
Robert Drake appealed the divorce judgment on multiple grounds. His primary argument was that the district court violated his due process rights by denying his request for a continuance of the trial. He also challenged the court’s adoption of the stipulated property distribution agreement, along with several other unspecified issues.
The Court’s Holding
The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the divorce judgment in a per curiam opinion under the summary affirmance procedures of N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(2), (4), and (8). The court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s handling of the continuance request, applying the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard established in Otten v. Otten, 2023 ND 134, ¶ 3, 993 N.W.2d 523.
The court declined to address Drake’s remaining arguments, finding them either inadequately briefed under N.D.R.App.P. 28(b)—which requires a statement of facts, the applicable standard of review, and citations to supporting authority—or without merit on their face. The challenge to the court’s adoption of the parties’ own stipulated property agreement was among those dismissed.
Key Takeaways
- A district court’s decision on a motion to continue trial is reviewed for abuse of discretion, a high bar that Robert Drake failed to meet here.
- Appellate arguments that lack a statement of facts, a standard of review, or citations to supporting authority will be rejected as inadequately briefed under N.D.R.App.P. 28(b).
- A party who stipulates to a marital property distribution agreement faces an uphill battle challenging that agreement on appeal.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces North Dakota appellate courts’ strict enforcement of briefing requirements. Litigants — particularly self-represented parties like Robert Drake, who appeared pro se on appeal — must satisfy the formal requirements of N.D.R.App.P. 28(b) or risk having their arguments dismissed without consideration on the merits.
The case also underscores the difficulty of mounting a due process challenge to a continuance denial. Courts retain broad discretion over trial scheduling, and absent a clear showing of prejudice and an abuse of that discretion, such challenges are unlikely to succeed on appeal.