State v. Depina — Ninth District partially reverses, holds trial court must make consecutive-sentence findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)

Case
State v. Depina
Court
Ohio Court of Appeals (Ninth District)
Date Decided
2026-05-27
Docket No.
31644
Judge(s)
Carr, Hensal, Sutton
Topics
Criminal Law, Sentencing, Appellate Practice
Source
Full opinion on CourtListener · PDF

Background

Dwayne Depina was indicted for rape and kidnapping arising from events in 2007 — sixteen years before the 2023 indictment. After the trial court denied his motion to dismiss based on preindictment delay, Depina negotiated a plea agreement and entered an Alford plea to reduced charges of gross sexual imposition and abduction. He was sentenced to consecutive 18-month terms for a total of three years. On appeal, Depina argued his plea was not knowing and voluntary because the court did not specifically advise that his Alford plea would waive appellate review of pretrial motions, and that counsel was ineffective for advising a guilty plea rather than no contest plea.

The Court’s Holding

The Ninth District affirmed the plea but reversed on sentencing. On the plea validity, the court applied State v. Jordan, holding that a trial court’s duty to advise about appellate rights arises at sentencing, not during the plea colloquy. The court also distinguished State v. Buggs, noting that Buggs involved an affirmative misstatement of law, whereas here the trial court correctly informed Depina he would waive appellate rights and confirmed the Alford plea was unrelated to pretrial rulings. The ineffective assistance claim failed because counsel’s negotiation significantly reduced Depina’s sentencing exposure from two first-degree felonies to lesser charges.

However, the court sustained Depina’s challenge to consecutive sentences, finding the trial court completely failed to make the findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) and State v. Bonnell at either the sentencing hearing or in the sentencing entry. The State conceded the error. The matter was remanded for a limited resentencing on the consecutive-sentence issue only.

Key Takeaways

  • An Alford plea is valid even without specific advisement about waiver of pretrial motion appellate rights; the duty to advise about appellate rights arises at sentencing, not during the plea.
  • An Alford plea that dramatically reduces sentencing exposure is not ineffective assistance, even if a no-contest plea would have preserved appellate rights to pretrial rulings.
  • Complete failure to make R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings for consecutive sentences requires remand for a limited resentencing, even where the State concedes error.

Why It Matters

This case is particularly instructive for defense attorneys negotiating Alford pleas. Counsel should expressly discuss with clients the effect of a guilty plea versus a no-contest plea on the ability to appeal pretrial rulings. The sentencing reversal is also a recurring issue in Ohio appellate practice: trial courts must make the Bonnell findings on the record, and the complete absence of findings mandates remand regardless of the merits of the consecutive-sentence decision.

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