Background
Daverrick Lash was convicted in 2016 of aggravated murder and related offenses, including firearm specifications. He received a life sentence with parole eligibility after 31 years. The Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions, and the Supreme Court of Ohio declined review.
In 2021, Lash applied for postconviction DNA testing under R.C. 2953.71 et seq. The trial court denied the application in a brief order stating that Lash had not shown the testing would be outcome determinative and that the results would not be probative. The Eighth District reversed, concluding that the order lacked the explanation required by R.C. 2953.73(D), and remanded for the trial court to state its analysis.
The Court’s Holding
The Supreme Court of Ohio held that a trial court satisfies R.C. 2953.73(D) when its order identifies a statutory reason for accepting or rejecting an application for postconviction DNA testing. The statute does not require findings of fact, conclusions of law, or a more detailed analysis.
The trial court’s statement that the requested testing would not be “outcome determinative” was sufficient because outcome determinativeness is a statutory condition for granting DNA testing under R.C. 2953.74(C)(4) and (5), and the term is defined by R.C. 2953.71(L). The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth District and remanded for that court to decide the unresolved question whether the trial court abused its discretion in rejecting Lash’s application.
Key Takeaways
- A postconviction DNA-testing order satisfies R.C. 2953.73(D) if it states a specific statutory reason for granting or denying the application.
- The statute does not require a trial court to provide detailed factual findings, legal conclusions, or an analysis explaining why the statutory criterion was or was not met.
- Compliance with the statute does not resolve whether the trial court abused its discretion; the Eighth District must address that separate issue on remand.
Why It Matters
The decision lowers the level of explanation Ohio trial courts must provide when ruling on postconviction DNA-testing applications and disapproves prior appellate decisions requiring more extensive analysis. A concise order tied to a statutory criterion is legally sufficient, although its brevity may still affect whether the ruling withstands abuse-of-discretion review.
Justice Brunner dissented, arguing that the statute’s requirement that reasons be given “as applied” to the statutory criteria demands some analysis and that rote recitations may impede meaningful appellate review.