Background
Atnight Media, LLC and several associated individuals sued Stephanie Jo Trude and Jessica Lynn Seng in Delaware County. The dispute involved online and public expression, and the defendants responded with special motions under Pennsylvania’s expanded anti-SLAPP statute. That law supplies an expedited mechanism to test claims targeting protected public expression and stays most proceedings while the special motion is pending.
The trial court heard oral argument on the motions, limited discovery, and ultimately dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims. The plaintiffs appealed, presenting challenges to the statute’s effective date, separation of powers, treatment of a preliminary-injunction request, denial of leave to amend, evaluation of evidence, restrictions on discovery, and the procedure used to decide the special motions.
Many arguments had not been distinctly raised when the trial court could address them. The Superior Court therefore first had to separate preserved procedural questions from theories advanced for the first time on appeal. The principal preserved issue concerned what Section 8340.16(d) means when it directs a court to “hear oral argument” after an anti-SLAPP motion is filed.
The Court’s Holding
Judge Nichols wrote for the panel in affirming the dismissal orders. The court held that challenges to the statute’s effectiveness and constitutionality were waived because the plaintiffs did not make those objections below. Passing references to the absence of Supreme Court rulemaking did not preserve a developed effective-date or separation-of-powers claim. The court likewise found waiver or other preservation defects affecting several challenges to the injunction, amendment, and evidentiary rulings.
On the preserved statutory issue, the panel rejected the contention that filing a special motion automatically triggers an evidentiary hearing. Section 8340.16(d)(1) says the court shall hear oral argument within 60 days. Its plain text does not say that witnesses must testify or that the court must convene a trial-like proceeding. The trial court conducted oral argument within the contemplated procedure, and the appellants themselves characterized the session as argument-only. That satisfied the command.
The statute separately identifies the materials a court may consider, including the special motion, responses, and evidence cognizable under Pennsylvania’s summary-judgment rule. It also creates a mechanism for limited discovery when necessary. Those provisions did not transform the required oral argument into an evidentiary hearing or establish an automatic right to develop testimony. Because the remaining preserved claims did not demonstrate reversible error, the orders stood.
Key Takeaways
- Pennsylvania’s anti-SLAPP statute requires oral argument within the statutory timetable, not an automatic evidentiary hearing.
- The court may evaluate written submissions and summary-judgment-type evidence without hearing live testimony.
- Effective-date and constitutional objections must be squarely raised in the trial court; allusions to rulemaking are not enough.
- Requests for discovery or exceptions to the statutory stay should identify the precise statutory basis and be preserved before appeal.
Why It Matters
Atnight Media is nonprecedential, but it gives Pennsylvania litigators early guidance on the mechanics of the Commonwealth’s broadened anti-SLAPP framework. The statute is designed for prompt resolution, and the panel’s reading keeps the required hearing focused on legal argument unless a separately justified need for discovery or additional proof is shown.
For plaintiffs facing a special motion, the decision counsels front-loading all objections: the statute’s applicability, constitutional or effective-date challenges, the need for targeted discovery, and any public-safety exception to the stay. Defendants should build a record around the pleadings and evidence permitted at the summary-judgment stage. Both sides should treat the oral-argument deadline as a substantive feature of the expedited process, while recognizing that “hearing” does not itself promise witness testimony.