Background
The Barringer estate dispute centers on control of Coastal Forest Resources Company. Paul Barringer II once held a twenty-percent voting interest that could break deadlocks between his daughters, Hampton Luzak and Merrill Light. Beginning with 1998 estate documents, he granted his wife, Merrill Barringer, a testamentary power to appoint trust property among his descendants. Mrs. Barringer’s contemporaneous will did not exercise that power. In 2012, however, Mr. Barringer purportedly transferred his voting interest to Light, giving Light control of the company. Luzak has separately challenged later estate documents and transfers based on alleged incapacity and undue influence.
In this action, Luzak asserted that Mrs. Barringer had agreed not to revoke her 1998 estate plan or, at least, had expressly or impliedly promised not to exercise the power of appointment in a way that would disturb Mr. Barringer’s intended balance of corporate control. Luzak sought enforcement of a contract not to revoke and imposition of a constructive trust. The circuit court granted summary judgment to Mrs. Barringer after additional discovery, despite an earlier judge’s denial of summary judgment.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of the contract-not-to-revoke theory but revived the constructive-trust claim. South Carolina requires clear and convincing proof of an agreement not to revoke a will, and the record did not establish the required contract. The court rejected an attempt to use generalized estate-planning circumstances as a substitute for evidence of mutual contractual assent.
The constructive-trust theory was different. A constructive trust is an equitable remedy imposed to prevent unjust enrichment where property was obtained or retained through fraud, abuse of confidence, or other circumstances making retention inequitable. The court held Luzak produced enough evidence for a factfinder to decide whether Mrs. Barringer expressly or impliedly promised not to use the power of appointment to upset the default disposition of the company’s voting shares, and whether Mr. Barringer relied on that promise within a confidential marital and estate-planning relationship. Because competing reasonable inferences existed, summary judgment was improper on that theory.
The panel also resolved several procedural issues. Additional discovery was not warranted because Luzak did not show that another deposition would likely reveal material evidence rather than amount to a fishing expedition. The earlier denial of summary judgment was not law of the case after substantial new discovery changed the record; a party may renew the motion when the operative facts differ. On remand, the circuit court must also reconsider its bifurcation order as the Supreme Court previously directed. The Court of Appeals declined to reach questions about which estate instrument controlled because revival of the constructive-trust theory made those issues unnecessary at this stage.
Key Takeaways
- A failed contract-not-to-revoke claim does not necessarily defeat a distinct constructive-trust claim arising from an alleged promise and confidential relationship.
- At summary judgment, testimony and circumstances supporting an implied promise can create a factual dispute over whether retaining or exercising property rights would be inequitable.
- A renewed summary-judgment motion is permissible after meaningful new discovery; the prior denial does not freeze the case when the evidentiary record changes.
- A party seeking more discovery must identify likely material evidence, not merely assert that a witness might have something additional to say.
Why It Matters
For South Carolina estate planners and fiduciary litigators, the decision underscores the danger of leaving understandings about powers of appointment, closely held business control, and coordinated estate plans unwritten. Even when the proof falls short of a binding contract not to revoke, surrounding promises and reliance may support equitable relief after expensive factual litigation.
The ruling is also a useful summary-judgment guide. Courts must distinguish claims that share facts but require different legal showings, and lawyers should explain precisely how later discovery changes a renewed motion. On remand, Luzak still bears the demanding burden of proving grounds for a constructive trust; the decision holds only that the present record permits a trial on that question. Transactional lawyers can reduce that uncertainty by documenting whether a power is intended to remain freely exercisable, whether spouses are making binding reciprocal commitments, and how voting interests should pass if later testamentary documents change the broader distribution plan.