Background
Neighbors Nancy Inman, Lisa Tolbert, and Vernell Humphries brought an action for breach of restrictive covenants against Sudie Dell Davis and Roosevelt Davis, who had placed a mobile home on their lot in Callison Estates, Phase I, in Greenwood County. The Callison Estates Restrictive Covenants prohibited “house trailers” from being placed on lots in the subdivision. The Davises argued two points: (1) their mobile home was situated on the “real portion” of their lot and thus complied with provision nine of the restrictive covenants, and (2) their residence met the covenants’ minimum-size requirements. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff neighbors, and the Davises appealed.
On appeal, the Davises did not challenge the circuit court’s finding that their property was subject to the Callison Estates Restrictive Covenants or that their structure constituted a “house trailer” under those covenants — making those rulings the law of the case. Their sole argument was that the phrase “real portion” in provision nine meant that a house trailer could be placed on any portion of their lot, thereby permitting what would otherwise be prohibited by the covenants.
The Court’s Holding
A unanimous panel affirmed. Reviewing the grant of summary judgment de novo on the question of law, the court held that the Davises’ interpretation of “real portion” was both unreasonable and contradicted by the unambiguous language of the restrictive covenant. Restrictive covenants in South Carolina are construed according to the plain and ordinary meaning of their terms, and a restriction on the use of property must be created in express terms or by plain and unmistakable implication. A reading that would permit a house trailer on “any portion” of a lot — the interpretation urged by the Davises — would negate the covenant’s express prohibition on house trailers entirely, since the structure would always be located on some portion of the lot. Because that interpretation was unreasonable and would render the restriction meaningless, the circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment.
Because the covenant-interpretation issue was dispositive, the court declined to reach the Davises’ remaining arguments about the size-requirement issue and the alleged improper credibility determination concerning their summary-judgment affidavits.
Key Takeaways
- South Carolina courts construe restrictive covenants according to the plain and ordinary meaning of their terms; an interpretation that renders a clearly stated prohibition meaningless will be rejected as unreasonable.
- An appellant who fails to challenge a lower court’s finding that a property is subject to a restrictive covenant, or that a structure meets the covenant’s defined category, concedes those findings as the law of the case and cannot rely on them as escape routes on appeal.
- On summary judgment, the court reviews purely legal questions — including whether a contract’s language is ambiguous — de novo; where covenant language is unambiguous, there is no genuine issue of material fact and summary judgment is proper.
- Parties opposing summary judgment with affidavits must ensure those affidavits create a genuine dispute about a material fact; affidavits that merely repeat counsel’s legal theory without identifying actual disputed facts will not prevent summary judgment.
Why It Matters
For South Carolina real estate and land-use practitioners, Inman v. Davis provides a straightforward illustration of how courts interpret restrictive covenant language. An interpretation that would swallow an express prohibition by arguing that the prohibited structure is located on some part of the lot — and therefore complies — will be rejected as self-defeating. Subdivision restrictions on mobile homes and house trailers are enforceable when their language is clear, and a court will not strain to find ambiguity where none exists.
The case also illustrates the law-of-the-case principle in a practical context: strategic choices about what to appeal have consequences. The Davises’ decision not to appeal the house-trailer classification meant the entire dispute reduced to a single textual question about the phrase “real portion,” which they could not win on the covenant’s plain language.