Background
Wilmington Savings Fund Society FSB, as trustee of Stanwich Mortgage Loan Trust I, brought a foreclosure action in Chester County against Ebonee D. Brown and Georgia M. Brown. The mortgaged property included a mobile home. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the bank and referred the foreclosure to a special referee. The Browns appealed on four grounds: (1) the circuit court erred in treating the mobile home as subject to the real-property mortgage; (2) genuine issues of material fact existed on their counterclaim for violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA); (3) the bank had asserted a claim-and-delivery action to gain possession of the mobile home without complying with the notice requirements for such a claim; and (4) the circuit court improperly struck their jury demand.
The Court’s Holding
A unanimous panel affirmed on all four grounds. On the mobile home issue, the court held the Browns raised no genuine issue of material fact: they relied solely on conclusory allegations rather than coming forward with specific evidence that the mobile home was not subject to the mortgage. The circuit court’s ruling, moreover, did not find the mobile home was a fixture in a technical sense, but rather that the parties intended it to be a permanent improvement to the real property secured by the mortgage — a finding supported by the evidentiary record and sufficient to bind it to the mortgage.
On the FDCPA counterclaim, the court likewise found the Browns’ opposition consisted only of conclusory allegations; they produced no specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue for trial. On the claim-and-delivery issue, the court found it without merit because the bank expressly stated in its summary-judgment motion and at the hearing that it was not asserting a claim-and-delivery action, and the circuit court accepted that representation. Finally, because foreclosure is an equitable action and the Browns’ FDCPA counterclaim was properly dismissed at summary judgment, there was no legal claim pending that would have entitled them to a jury trial. Mortgage foreclosure in South Carolina is an action in equity, and parties in equity have no right to a trial by jury as a matter of right.
Key Takeaways
- A mobile home that the parties intended to be a permanent improvement to the real property securing a mortgage may be subject to that mortgage; a borrower opposing foreclosure must come forward with specific evidence — not mere conclusory allegations — to create a genuine issue of material fact on this question.
- A mortgage foreclosure action in South Carolina is an action in equity; defendants in a foreclosure proceeding have no constitutional right to a jury trial, and that right is not created by the filing of a legal counterclaim that is later dismissed at summary judgment.
- Rule 56(e), SCRCP, requires that a party opposing a motion for summary judgment “do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts” — the party must come forward with specific facts establishing a genuine issue for trial; conclusory allegations or denials of pleadings are insufficient.
- A claim-and-delivery theory will not be imputed to a bank that expressly disavows such a claim at the summary-judgment hearing; issues fabricated from an argument the opposing party did not actually make will be rejected.
Why It Matters
For South Carolina foreclosure and consumer-finance practitioners, Wilmington Savings v. Brown illustrates several common defensive arguments in mortgage foreclosure cases and why they fail without factual support. Borrowers who argue that a mobile home is not subject to a mortgage, or that FDCPA violations occurred, must substantiate those arguments with evidence—affidavits, documents, or other specific facts—not bare assertions. A counterclaim that survives to the summary-judgment stage does not automatically generate a right to jury trial on the foreclosure itself; once the legal counterclaim is dismissed, the equity nature of foreclosure controls.
The decision also provides useful confirmation that South Carolina courts will not expand a bank’s claim beyond what the bank asserts in its filings; borrowers who argue the bank impliedly raised an unasserted theory of recovery will face short work at the appellate level.