Background
Chad Gibbs pleaded guilty in Lexington County to two counts of second-degree sexual exploitation of a minor involving his stepdaughter. The plea court sentenced him to concurrent eight-year terms of imprisonment but also awarded him 1,831 days of time-served credit—representing the approximately five years he had spent on GPS-monitored bond while the case was pending. Gibbs was initially released on a $100,000 surety bond with GPS monitoring. His only bond conditions were to have no contact with the victim and not to return to her residence. He was later permitted to move to Pennsylvania, with the court granting him the additional freedom to travel to adjoining states for work with advance notice.
The State appealed the credit award, arguing that South Carolina Code § 24-13-40 (2025) allows sentencing courts to give mandatory credit only for actual pre-trial jail time, and discretionary credit only for time spent on “monitored house arrest”—a status Gibbs’s GPS-monitored bond did not satisfy. Gibbs argued that his GPS monitoring was functionally equivalent to house arrest. The circuit court had sided with Gibbs, and the State appealed directly.
The Court’s Holding
Reversed and Remanded for resentencing. A unanimous panel held that GPS monitoring without home-confinement restrictions does not constitute “monitored house arrest” under § 24-13-40. Sentencing courts have no authority to grant time-served credit for electronic monitoring alone.
The court read § 24-13-40 together with two related statutes. The South Carolina Home Detention Act (§ 24-13-1530) governs house arrest and defines it as confinement to the home with specific, narrow exceptions (medical appointments, court appearances, and the like). The electronic monitoring statute (§ 17-15-35) governs GPS monitoring as a bond condition and makes clear that electronic monitoring may be ordered “in lieu of setting or requiring the posting of bond or as an additional condition of the release on bond”—without necessarily imposing home confinement. Reading those provisions together, the court concluded that “monitored house arrest” in § 24-13-40 requires actual home confinement, not merely a GPS ankle bracelet.
Gibbs’s situation fell plainly outside that definition. He was allowed to move out of state, reside in Pennsylvania, and travel to adjoining states for work purposes. He had significantly more freedom of movement than even typical bond conditions afford, and could come and go from his home without restriction as long as he stayed within the authorized region. The court also pointed to the South Carolina Supreme Court’s 2020 opinion in State v. Field, 429 S.C. 578, 840 S.E.2d 548 (2020), which—though ultimately decided on error-preservation grounds—stated in dicta that the Supreme Court agreed with the State’s argument that GPS monitoring without house arrest restrictions does not qualify for the credit.
Key Takeaways
- Section 24-13-40 requires mandatory credit for actual pre-trial jail time and permits discretionary credit only for “monitored house arrest”—a status that requires home confinement, not merely electronic monitoring without restrictions on the defendant’s freedom of movement.
- GPS monitoring imposed as a bond condition without house arrest restrictions cannot support a time-served credit, even if the GPS device remains in place throughout the pre-plea period. The device alone does not convert the bond into house arrest.
- Sentencing courts lack statutory authority under § 24-13-40 to grant credit for electronic monitoring without house arrest; a sentence that does so is subject to reversal by the State on direct appeal.
- Defendants seeking pre-plea credit should seek formal monitored house arrest conditions under the Home Detention Act, not merely GPS monitoring with open-ended travel permissions. The distinction matters at sentencing.
Why It Matters
Gibbs resolves a question the Supreme Court left open in State v. Field (2020) and provides a clear rule for trial courts: GPS-monitored bond with no meaningful restriction on the defendant’s freedom of movement is not house arrest, regardless of how long the defendant wears the monitor. That distinction can have dramatic practical consequences—here, the credit award effectively absorbed nearly five years of an eight-year sentence before a single day of prison was served.
For South Carolina criminal defense practitioners, the lesson is to negotiate formally structured monitored house arrest under § 24-13-1530 if pre-plea credit is a priority. GPS monitoring alone—especially if paired with out-of-state residence or broad travel permissions—will not qualify. For prosecutors, Gibbs provides authority to challenge GPS-only credit awards at sentencing without waiting for appellate review, since the sentencing court lacks the power to grant such credit in the first instance.