CGM — High Court upheld refusal of relocation under the Afghanistan Response Route

Case
R (CGM) v Secretary of State for Defence
Court
High Court (Administrative Court) (United Kingdom)
Judge
Collins Rice (Queen Elizabeth II, 2020)
Date Decided
31 July 2026
Citation
[2026] EWHC 2033 (Admin)
Topics
Judicial Review, Afghan Relocation, Administrative Law, Procedural Fairness

Background

CGM, an Afghan national, challenged a Ministry of Defence decision that he was ineligible for relocation to the United Kingdom through the Afghanistan Response Route. The government created the ARR after a 2022 data breach exposed information concerning applicants under the Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy. The ARR was an ex gratia scheme directed at people assessed to face the highest risk because of the breach, particularly holders of specified high-profile roles or other high-profile roles carrying equivalent risk.

CGM had served in Afghanistan’s Directorate of Protective Service of Government Officials, providing security for senior officials and responding to terrorist attacks. Because his role was not specifically listed in the ARR policy, he could qualify only if a decision-maker found that it was a different high-profile role placing him at risk equivalent to holders of the listed roles. A caseworker concluded in May 2025 that he did not satisfy that condition. The government discontinued the ARR in July 2025 after an independent review concluded that inclusion in the leaked dataset was unlikely materially to increase an individual’s existing risk.

CGM argued that the caseworker had misapplied the policy or reached an irrational decision because the evidence showed that he had acted against Taliban activity and had attracted Taliban attention. He also alleged procedural unfairness because the secret operation of the ARR prevented him from knowing its criteria, submitting targeted evidence, or seeking review before the scheme closed.

The Court’s Holding

Mrs Justice Collins Rice dismissed the judicial-review claim. The ARR required more than evidence that an individual faced serious danger from the Taliban: the claimant had to have occupied a high-profile role and to face risk equivalent to holders of the listed roles as a result of the data breach. Those were evaluative questions on which the decision-maker had broad discretion. The evidence did not compel a finding that CGM’s protective role was high-profile or that the breach placed him at the required level of enhanced risk.

The court found no material error of law, irrationality, or procedural unfairness. Although seniority was not an express requirement and military action was not necessary under the policy, those imperfections in the caseworker’s reasoning did not invalidate the decision. The caseworker could rationally distinguish CGM’s personal-protection duties from more strategic, targeted, or proactive counter-Taliban work and could regard his role as auxiliary to those of high-profile officials.

The court also held that the scheme’s secrecy and short-form reasons did not make the process unfair in the circumstances. Any expected opportunity for review disappeared as an inherent consequence of the unchallenged decision to terminate the ARR after its factual premise had collapsed. Even if the original decision had been unlawful, ordering reconsideration under a discontinued policy whose underlying risk premise had been discredited would not have been practical, just, or appropriate.

Key Takeaways

  • ARR eligibility required a high-profile role and equivalent highest risk caused or enhanced by the data breach; general exposure to Taliban reprisal was insufficient.
  • Whether an unlisted role was high-profile and carried equivalent risk was an evaluative judgment, and the evidence permitted more than one rational conclusion.
  • The closure of the ARR eliminated its anticipated review process, but that consequence could not be attacked indirectly through a procedural challenge when the closure decision itself was not challenged.

Why It Matters

The judgment emphasizes that courts will scrutinize unpublished government policies and require public authorities to apply them lawfully, even when affected individuals do not know the policies exist. But anxious scrutiny does not permit a court to broaden a narrowly targeted discretionary scheme beyond its stated eligibility criteria.

It also addresses remedies after a government program has been terminated because its underlying factual justification has fallen away. A claimant may not obtain reconsideration under the former policy when meaningful application of that policy is no longer possible and the decision to close it remains unchallenged.

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