Background
Christopher Cunningham, a serving prisoner, was transferred from HMP Wakefield to HMP Berwyn on 27 June 2025. Before departure, he underwent two X-ray body scans because the first was inconclusive; he was scanned again upon arrival at Berwyn. The second Wakefield scan was negative, and Cunningham did not object to any of the scans at the time.
Cunningham sought judicial review of the prisons’ policies and the three scans. He argued that the local policies conflicted with Part 7A of the Justification of Practices Involving Ionising Radiation Regulations 2004 and the national policy framework, and that they unjustifiably interfered with Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. He also contended that each scan was individually unlawful.
The Court’s Holding
The High Court dismissed every ground of challenge. It held that Wakefield and Berwyn lawfully identified cohorts for scanning through security-committee decisions based on intelligence or reasonable suspicion, rather than randomly or routinely. The committees could assess the intelligence, necessity, benefits, health detriment, and proportionality for a cohort, while officers administering a scan confirmed that the prisoner belonged to that cohort and considered individual matters such as radiation-dose limits, health, and ability to undergo the scan.
The court rejected the argument that the officer at the scanner had to reconsider all the information and repeat the security committee’s proportionality assessment. This two-level process individually justified each exposure and complied with the national frameworks, the 2004 Regulations, and the conditions of the relevant approval. The policies were accessible and foreseeable, pursued prison security and crime-prevention objectives, and constituted a proportionate interference with Article 8. Because the policies were lawful, the separate challenge to Cunningham’s three scans also failed.
Key Takeaways
- A prison may use intelligence to identify a cohort for X-ray body scanning when it reasonably suspects internal conveyance within the group but cannot determine which members are carrying illicit items.
- Individual justification does not require the officer administering a scan to repeat the security committee’s full assessment, provided the officer verifies cohort membership and considers relevant personal circumstances and dosage limits.
- Intelligence-led cohort scanning can comply with Article 8 when it is foreseeable, regularly reviewed, necessary for prison security or crime prevention, and proportionate.
Why It Matters
The judgment confirms that “individual justification” under the ionising-radiation regime can result from decisions made at different operational levels. A prison security committee may perform the central risk-and-benefit assessment for a properly defined cohort, with frontline staff addressing cohort membership and prisoner-specific contraindications.
The ruling also distinguishes lawful cohort scanning from indiscriminate blanket or random scanning. For prison authorities, the decision underscores the importance of intelligence-based selection, regular review, dose controls, documented proportionality, and procedures allowing relevant personal circumstances to be considered.