Background
On 1 September 2025, the Home Secretary suspended new applications for refugee family reunion (RFR) under Appendix Family Reunion (Sponsors with Protection) (Appendix FRP), requiring refugees’ family members to apply instead under the general family reunion route (Appendix FM). The suspension was pending a wider review of family reunion rules. Since 2023, Appendix FRP had provided a streamlined path for pre-flight spouses and dependent children of refugees to reunite without fees, income requirements, language tests, or recourse-to-public-funds restrictions. The route had been heavily utilised: applications increased from 9,747 in 2019 to 23,020 in 2024, with 20,817 grants in the year to June 2025 (an 86.4% grant rate).
Three judicial review claims were brought by: Safe Passage International (a refugee assistance charity); AXY (an Afghan refugee with a wife and six children, one severely disabled, remaining in Afghanistan; diagnosed with Complex PTSD and Major Depressive Disorder); BSZ (a Sri Lankan Tamil refugee with a wife and two children in an Indian refugee camp; suffering PTSD and depression); and ESH (a Kurdish refugee with a wife and two children in Iran; experiencing PTSD and anxiety). The suspension shifted applicants to Appendix FM, which imposes minimum income requirements (£29,000 or £88,500 savings), language requirements, fees (£1,938 plus Immigration Health Surcharge, totalling £5,043–£20,378 depending on the route), and complex evidence requirements, particularly for Article 8 human rights claims.
The Court’s Holding
Mr Justice Coppel held that the Home Secretary’s decision to suspend Appendix FRP was unlawful. The court found the suspension irrational on multiple grounds. The evidence showed that the Home Office had not properly investigated whether the suspension would achieve its stated objective of relieving pressure on local authorities, and had failed to weigh the demonstrable harm to vulnerable refugees and their families—including children with disabilities, those suffering serious mental health conditions, and families facing indefinite separation in conflict zones—against any purported benefit. The court found the process was fundamentally flawed: decision-makers had not undertaken the necessary enquiry into impact and efficacy before taking the decision.
The court also found breaches of the Home Secretary’s duty under section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 to have regard to the welfare of children, and breaches of the Public Sector Equality Duty under the Equality Act 2010. The court identified that the suspension would disproportionately harm children, including disabled children. The Appendix FM route posed substantial obstacles: the typical refugee applicant, having arrived with minimal funds and been unable to work during their protection claim, could not meet Appendix FM’s financial requirements and was unlikely to secure legal representation (a shortage of qualified advisors compounded matters). The court rejected the Home Office’s proposition that Appendix FM was a straightforward alternative, finding the evidence showed complex applications involving expert evidence, substantial preparation time (estimated 6–12 months), and heightened risk of initial refusal requiring costly appeals.
Key Takeaways
- A policy suspending a simpler immigration route pending review must be based on proper investigation of whether it will achieve its stated objectives and must weigh actual harms to vulnerable groups against any benefits.
- The Home Secretary’s statutory duty to consider the welfare of children (section 55, BCIA 2009) applies to family reunion decisions; a policy affecting separated children must be supported by evidence and reasoning on child welfare impacts.
- The Public Sector Equality Duty requires active consideration of discriminatory effects; a policy that burdens a protected group (families with disabled children, in this case) must be justified by clear evidence, not assumptions.
- Procedural rationality in administrative law demands that a decision-maker inquire into and assess whether a decision will work as intended before adoption, particularly when it affects fundamental rights such as family life.
- An alternative immigration route cannot be treated as a seamless substitute if it is materially more onerous, requires resources (legal aid, expert evidence) in short supply, or poses significantly greater obstacles to vulnerable applicants.
Why It Matters
This decision reaffirms the court’s role in policing the threshold of rationality for significant changes to immigration policy, especially those affecting vulnerable populations. The Home Secretary cannot invoke a policy review to justify suspension of an existing route without demonstrating that the decision is rationally connected to achieving its stated aims and that the impact on affected individuals has been properly assessed. The judgment is significant for establishing that merely offering an alternative route—without ensuring it is truly accessible to the affected group—does not cure a defective decision to suspend the original route.
For refugees and their families, the decision reinstates access to a less onerous family reunion pathway. The judgment also sets important precedent on the convergence of administrative law principles (rationality, procedural fairness) with human rights protections (right to family life, non-discrimination) in immigration contexts, and underscores that the welfare of separated children must be a material consideration in major policy changes.