Background
In August 2024, Johnathan Billewicz visited the Fair Haven town office with his mother to discuss outstanding public-information requests. After the town manager refused to release records until Billewicz paid preparation costs, Billewicz went to a nearby park and began yelling obscenities at the town manager, calling him a “little bitch and a dick” and asking what he was “going to do about it.” The town manager retreated to his office, where an elderly resident had taken shelter from the commotion. A town employee and the town manager both reported the incident to police. Two weeks later, a Fair Haven officer served Billewicz at his home with a citation — without arrest or custody — for disorderly conduct by using abusive or obscene language in a public place, in violation of 13 V.S.A. § 1026(a)(3).
The State filed a criminal information, and the criminal division found probable cause for the charge. Billewicz moved to dismiss for lack of probable cause, arguing his words were not legally obscene. The State then amended the information to charge disorderly conduct through “fighting or violent, tumultuous or threatening behavior” under § 1026(a)(1). The criminal court found no probable cause for that amended charge — due to insufficient physical conduct — and dismissed the case.
Billewicz then filed a civil complaint in November 2024 against the Town of Fair Haven, its town manager, the police chief, and the arresting officer, alleging false arrest, First Amendment and Vermont constitutional violations, malicious prosecution, and negligent employment, retention, and supervision. He voluntarily withdrew his constitutional and false-arrest claims before summary judgment. The Superior Court, Rutland Unit, granted summary judgment to all defendants, holding that the undisputed finding of probable cause for the original charge defeated both the malicious prosecution and negligence claims. Billewicz appealed only the malicious prosecution ruling.
The Court’s Holding
The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. The three-justice panel held that because the criminal division made an undisputed finding of probable cause for the original disorderly conduct charge under § 1026(a)(3), defendants were entitled to a presumption that probable cause existed. Under Lay v. Pettengill, 2011 VT 127, that presumption is rebuttable only by showing that the earlier finding rested on misleading, fabricated, or otherwise improper evidence — a showing Billewicz did not make. Although he disputed certain details in the town manager’s account, he produced no evidence that police fabricated or improperly framed their report. Because the existence of probable cause is a complete defense to malicious prosecution, his claim failed at the threshold.
The court also rejected Billewicz’s argument that the State’s later decision to amend the information to a charge that lacked probable cause could be attributed to the defendant officers and town officials. No evidence showed that any defendant was involved in the State’s independent decision to file the amended charge. Pointing to Ryan v. Orient Insurance Co., the court emphasized that a defendant in a malicious prosecution action must be the proximate and efficient cause of setting the prosecution in motion; derivative responsibility based solely on having filed the valid original citation was insufficient.
Finally, the court distinguished Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, 602 U.S. 556 (2024), which holds that probable cause for one charge does not automatically defeat a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim based on a separate, baseless charge filed simultaneously by the same officials. Here, the problematic amended charge was brought by the State — not by defendants — so Chiaverini‘s rationale did not apply.
Key Takeaways
- A prior judicial finding of probable cause creates a rebuttable presumption against a malicious prosecution plaintiff; that presumption falls only upon proof of misleading, fabricated, or improper evidence underlying the earlier finding.
- Defendants in a malicious prosecution suit must be the proximate cause of the offending prosecution; a State’s independent decision to amend a charge to one lacking probable cause cannot be imputed to officers whose original citation was supported by probable cause.
- Chiaverini‘s rule — that probable cause on one charge does not doom a malicious prosecution claim on a simultaneous baseless charge — does not extend to situations where the baseless charge was filed by a different actor (the State) at a later time.
- This decision is an unpublished entry order by a three-justice panel and carries no precedential weight before any Vermont tribunal.
Why It Matters
The decision illustrates the high bar plaintiffs face when challenging law enforcement conduct through malicious prosecution after a judicial body has already found probable cause. By tying the proximate-cause element tightly to each discrete charging decision, the court insulates officers from civil liability when a prosecutor independently escalates or amends charges in ways that later prove unsupported — even if the original enforcement action spawned the criminal proceeding.
Practitioners should note the court’s careful handling of Chiaverini: the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2024 ruling creates room for charge-specific malicious prosecution claims, but Vermont’s panel confined that rule to situations where the same officials filed all charges simultaneously. Defense counsel can therefore argue that intervening prosecutorial decisions break the causal chain required to hold police defendants liable for a prosecution they did not directly control.