Background
Melanie MacEachern and Kurtis Mellett are neighbors on Lake Eligo in Craftsbury, Vermont, whose families have been embroiled in litigation since May 2024. In October 2025, MacEachern filed for a civil order against stalking in Orleans Superior Court, alleging that Mellett and his wife had been systematically harassing her by repeatedly driving ATVs along her property line, circling her home by car, and standing at the property line for hours at a time watching her. MacEachern testified that Mellett would emerge on foot specifically when she stepped outside, causing her to stop gardening, curtail walks, withdraw from friends, avoid bringing her daughter to the library, and ultimately consider selling her home. Her husband and a friend corroborated her account in substantial detail.
Mellett denied purposeful surveillance, testifying that he passed the property for legitimate reasons—observing road work, walking for pleasure, or accessing portions of his own land—and that any glances toward MacEachern’s home were incidental. His wife offered similar testimony. Neither Mellett nor his wife sought an anti-stalking order against MacEachern, and Mellett introduced no evidence that MacEachern approached or regularly watched his property.
The Orleans Superior Court held a hearing and denied the petition. The trial judge found, with little elaboration, that both sides appeared to be “watching each other’s every move” and acknowledged that the relationship had caused MacEachern emotional distress and behavioral changes. Nevertheless, the court concluded without further analysis that the evidence did not satisfy the anti-stalking statute. After MacEachern’s counsel moved for reconsideration, the court clarified that it had not found that Mellett was “following, monitoring, or surveilling” her, characterizing his conduct instead as merely going back and forth on his property and looking around. MacEachern appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The Vermont Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the trial court’s findings were inadequate to support its legal conclusion. The court noted an internal tension in the trial court’s reasoning: its initial observation that both parties were “watching each other’s every move” would, if credited as a factual finding about Mellett, have supported a conclusion that he surveilled or monitored MacEachern within the meaning of Vermont’s civil stalking statute. Yet after reconsideration, the court appeared to walk that finding back without resolving the conflicting testimony or making any credibility determinations.
The panel emphasized that the trial court made no findings on several elements necessary to sustain or reject a stalking claim: it did not identify which version of events it credited, did not resolve the stark conflicts in testimony about Mellett’s behavior and intent, and made no express finding on whether Mellett knew or should have known his conduct would cause a reasonable person substantial emotional distress. The court observed that the evidence of emotional distress and behavioral modification was effectively uncontroverted, and that the trial court’s “no doubt” language could have supported a finding on that element—but the murkiness left by the post-reconsideration statements made appellate review impossible.
Applying de novo review to the legal conclusions and deferential review to factual findings, the court held that a trial court has a “fundamental duty to make all findings necessary to support its conclusions, resolve the issues before it, and provide an adequate basis for appellate review.” Because the existing findings failed that standard, the case was remanded for additional factual findings on all elements of stalking under 12 V.S.A. § 5131.
Key Takeaways
- Under Vermont’s civil anti-stalking statute, a court must issue a no-stalking order if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant engaged in a “course of conduct”—two or more acts of following, monitoring, or surveilling—that the defendant knew or should have known would cause a reasonable person to fear for their safety or suffer substantial emotional distress.
- “Surveillance” requires intent to closely watch or carefully observe a person; merely passing by and looking around is insufficient. “Monitoring” involves tracking or collecting information about a person’s activities.
- A trial court cannot avoid issuing adequate findings by characterizing ambiguous conduct in conclusory terms. Where testimony directly conflicts on material issues of behavior and intent, the court must make credibility findings and resolve those conflicts on the record.
- An apparent finding that a defendant was “watching plaintiff’s every move” is legally inconsistent with a conclusion that no monitoring or surveillance occurred—and a court cannot silently retreat from such a finding without explanation.
- This decision is an unpublished three-justice panel entry order and is not to be considered as precedent before any tribunal.
Why It Matters
The decision underscores that trial courts handling civil stalking petitions must do more than announce a conclusion—they must generate a record sufficient for appellate review, including explicit credibility assessments and element-by-element analysis. For practitioners, the case illustrates that a trial court’s ambiguous or internally contradictory oral findings can itself be grounds for reversal, even where the appellate court does not itself determine whether stalking occurred.
The ruling also clarifies the boundaries of the monitoring and surveillance definitions in Vermont’s anti-stalking statute. Neighbor disputes frequently involve conduct that straddles the line between legitimate use of one’s property and harassing surveillance of an adjacent owner. The court’s remand signals that documented behavioral modification in the victim—ceasing outdoor activities, withdrawing from social life, considering relocating—combined with evidence of deliberate, repeated observation, may well satisfy the statutory elements if the trial court properly finds the facts.