Background
In February 2019, Otter Creek Solar LLC filed a petition with the Vermont Public Utility Commission (PUC) for a certificate of public good (CPG) to build and operate a solar facility in Bennington, Vermont. The PUC denied the CPG petition in July 2024. After moving for reconsideration, Otter Creek filed a second motion in September 2024 seeking to propound written interrogatories to the PUC Commissioners themselves to determine whether each had read the record as required by 3 V.S.A. § 811 of the Vermont Administrative Procedure Act (VAPA). Otter Creek characterized commissioner compliance with § 811 as a “recurring issue” in its dealings with the PUC.
The PUC denied both motions in November 2024. On the interrogatory request, the PUC reasoned that it had complied with § 811, that Otter Creek offered no factual basis to doubt the Commissioners had read the record, and — critically — that the PUC sits in a quasi-judicial capacity when adjudicating CPG petitions, meaning parties have no right to conduct discovery into its Commissioners’ deliberative processes.
Otter Creek then filed a complaint in the civil division of the Vermont Superior Court under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 74 and 3 V.S.A. § 809b(a), arguing that provision authorized superior court review of the discovery denial. The PUC moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the superior court granted that motion in April 2025. Otter Creek appealed to the Supreme Court of Vermont.
The Court’s Holding
The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, holding that 3 V.S.A. § 809b does not provide a mechanism to challenge a PUC order that denies a discovery request. Examining the text and structure of §§ 809a and 809b together, the court concluded the two provisions were designed to operate in tandem: § 809a empowers agencies to compel testimony or documents from nonparties via subpoena, while § 809b gives aggrieved persons a forum in superior court to challenge orders that compel action — i.e., subpoenas or discovery orders directed at a party. An order refusing to compel discovery simply falls outside § 809b’s scope. Because no subpoena or order compelling discovery was ever issued, the superior court correctly found it lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
The court also rejected Otter Creek’s surplusage argument — that reading “discovery order” to cover only compulsion orders would render those words redundant next to “subpoena.” The court explained that “discovery order” meaningfully expands coverage to formal agency discovery orders directed at parties (distinct from subpoenas aimed at nonparties), without sweeping in orders that deny discovery requests. The statutory language unambiguously signals this intent, making resort to legislative history unnecessary.
The court added an independent ground: even setting aside jurisdiction, the interrogatories Otter Creek sought would have invaded the Commissioners’ deliberative privilege. Because the PUC Commissioners act in a quasi-judicial capacity, they are protected — as judges are — from compelled disclosure of their deliberative processes and mental impressions. No reading of § 809b opens the door to that kind of discovery.
Key Takeaways
- 3 V.S.A. § 809b authorizes superior court challenges only to agency orders that compel discovery or testimony — not to orders that deny a party’s request for discovery.
- Vermont’s §§ 809a and 809b must be read together as complementary provisions: § 809a enforces agency subpoenas against nonparties; § 809b lets parties challenge compulsory discovery orders directed at them.
- PUC Commissioners acting in a quasi-judicial capacity enjoy deliberative privilege; a litigant cannot use interrogatories or other discovery to probe whether Commissioners read the record or how they deliberated.
- Affiliate entities of Otter Creek have now raised and lost the same § 811 “Commissioners failed to read the record” argument in at least three separate proceedings.
Why It Matters
This decision clarifies an important boundary in Vermont administrative practice: a party unhappy with an agency’s refusal to allow discovery cannot bypass the normal administrative-appeal route by filing a § 809b action in superior court. The superior court’s jurisdiction under that provision is triggered only when an agency has actually issued a compulsory order — a subpoena or discovery order — and a party seeks to resist or modify it. Lawyers handling PUC proceedings and other contested-case agency matters should not expect § 809b to serve as a general-purpose vehicle for challenging unfavorable discovery rulings.
The court’s reaffirmation of quasi-judicial deliberative privilege is equally significant for energy and utility practitioners. Attempts to interrogate commissioners or agency adjudicators about their reading of the record or their internal reasoning will face a firm constitutional and common-law barrier, separate from any statutory question. Combined with the Vermont Supreme Court’s December 2025 ruling affirming the underlying CPG denial in In re Petition of Otter Creek Solar LLC, 2025 VT 65, this decision closes the book on Otter Creek’s multi-front challenge to the PUC’s process.