Background
Alexis Moore sought an anti-stalking order against her neighbor Amanda Fitzgerald, alleging repeated assaults, following, and threats. Moore filed her complaint in October 2025 and requested emergency relief, which the trial court denied. Following a final hearing in November 2025, Moore testified that Fitzgerald engaged in aggressive conduct including standing outside her window screaming obscenities, following her to retail locations and the post office, pounding on her door, and threatening to break her leg and beat her “upside the head.” However, Moore’s testimony was general and lacked specificity regarding dates, times, and precise details of the incidents.
The trial court found that Moore failed to meet her burden of proving that Fitzgerald made true threats or engaged in monitoring or following, and therefore denied the petition for an anti-stalking order. Moore appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by applying a “true threats” standard that she contended did not appear in Vermont’s anti-stalking statute.
The Court’s Holding
The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision and upheld the application of the “true threats” standard. The court held that Vermont’s anti-stalking statute, 12 V.S.A. § 5131, implicitly incorporates the “true threats” doctrine through its explicit exclusion of constitutionally protected activity. The court reasoned that because the statute excludes First Amendment-protected conduct from its definition of stalking, the definition of “threatening” behavior must be limited to “true threats.”
The court defined true threats as “those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals,” citing its prior decision in Hinkson v. Stevens (2020 VT 69). The court explained that under First Amendment doctrine, states cannot restrict speech generally but may prohibit “certain narrow and well-defined classes of expression” that carry little social value, including true threats. By explicitly protecting constitutionally protected activity, Vermont’s statute operates within these established First Amendment boundaries.
Key Takeaways
- Vermont’s anti-stalking statute incorporates the constitutional “true threats” standard through its exclusion of protected activity, even though the statute does not use the term “true threats” explicitly.
- Threatening behavior in a stalking claim must meet the high bar of demonstrating the speaker’s serious intent to commit unlawful violence, not merely threatening language or hostile conduct.
- Courts will not second-guess a trial court’s credibility determinations when reviewing the sufficiency of evidence in stalking cases.
Why It Matters
This decision provides important guidance on Vermont’s anti-stalking statute and clarifies that challenges under this statute must comply with First Amendment protections. By anchoring the statute’s threat requirement to the constitutional “true threats” doctrine, the court ensures that the anti-stalking law does not sweep in protected speech or hostile conduct that falls short of a serious intent to commit violence. This interpretation protects free speech rights while preserving the statute’s core purpose of addressing genuine safety threats.
The decision underscores that plaintiffs seeking anti-stalking orders must present specific evidence of conduct meeting the true threats standard, not merely general allegations of aggressive or offensive behavior. This clarification may influence how trial courts evaluate and how plaintiffs present evidence in future anti-stalking cases in Vermont.