Williams v. Commonwealth — Reversed revocation because timely process did not notify Williams that his suspended sentence was at risk

Case
Jayson Michael Williams v. Commonwealth of Virginia
Court
Court of Appeals of Virginia
Judge
Ortiz; Chaney; Frucci
Date Decided
September 29, 2026
Docket No.
0736-25-1
Topics
Suspended Sentences; Restitution; Revocation Notice; Absconding
Source
Read the full opinion

Background

Jayson Michael Williams pleaded guilty to grand larceny in 1996 and received a ten-year sentence with all but four months suspended, subject to conditions that included good behavior and payment of $51,821 in restitution. Following earlier violations, the circuit court entered a March 15, 2011 order resuspending his remaining sentence in full and conditioning the suspension on ten years of good behavior from that date.

The court later conducted restitution-compliance proceedings. After Williams failed to appear for a March 2, 2023 review hearing, the court issued a capias charging contempt for nonpayment of restitution under Code § 19.2-358(E). In 2024, after Williams was arrested, the Commonwealth expressly sought revocation of his suspended sentence. The circuit court ultimately revoked the suspension, ordered Williams to serve six months, and also imposed 60 days for contempt.

The Court’s Holding

The Court of Appeals held that Code § 19.2-306(B) required timely process notifying Williams, or compelling his appearance, for a proceeding in which revocation of his suspended sentence was at issue. His suspension expired March 15, 2021, making March 15, 2024 the latest applicable deadline under the statute’s three-year restitution provision. The restitution-review orders and contempt capias issued before that deadline did not satisfy the statute because they did not notify Williams that revocation was at issue.

The later revocation-directed process was untimely. Even assuming Williams had absconded, his absence did not automatically extend the statutory period. Code § 19.2-306(C) permits a court to extend a probation or suspension period based on absconding, but the circuit court did not exercise that discretionary authority here. The appellate court therefore concluded that the circuit court lacked active jurisdiction to revoke the suspended sentence, reversed that portion of the judgment, and entered final judgment on it.

Key Takeaways

  • Process concerning restitution review or contempt does not satisfy Code § 19.2-306(B) unless it gives notice that revocation of the suspended sentence is at issue.
  • The three-year period applicable to restitution violations runs from expiration of the probation or suspension period, not from a later restitution review or modification of payment terms.
  • Absconding does not automatically extend the statutory period; the circuit court must exercise its discretionary authority to order an extension.

Why It Matters

The decision distinguishes a court’s continuing authority to review restitution compliance from its authority to revoke a suspended sentence. Although restitution proceedings may lead to several remedies, incarceration through revocation requires compliance with the separate notice and timing requirements governing revocation.

The ruling affects only the revocation and resuspension of Williams’s sentence. It leaves intact the contempt finding, the 60-day contempt sentence, and his continuing restitution obligation.

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