Background
Katherine Heinzel, a former Newport Beach police officer and traffic accident investigator, was convicted in August 2016 of gross vehicular manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 191.5, subd. (a)) and two counts of driving under the influence causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subds. (a) & (b)), with enhancements for great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (a)) and great bodily injury to more than one victim (Veh. Code, § 23558). The charges arose from a November 2011 crash in which she, driving at least 91 miles per hour with an estimated blood alcohol content of 0.13 to 0.15 percent, rear-ended another vehicle on Interstate 15, killing 20-year-old Davionne Kelly and seriously injuring two passengers. She was sentenced to eight years eight months in state prison; her first trial's convictions were reversed for instructional error.
In July 2025, after serving her sentence, Heinzel petitioned for expungement under Penal Code section 1203.4b based on her successful participation in the California Conservation Camp Program as an incarcerated fire crew member, submitting a declaration, letters, and certificates attesting to her rehabilitation, sobriety, employment, and volunteer work. The People opposed, arguing relief would not be in the interest of justice given the severity of her conduct, her training and experience as a police officer and accident investigator, her failure to offer help and her flight from the scene, and the victims' families' adamant opposition, but did not contest her eligibility.
At the hearing, the trial court overruled a defense objection and allowed the decedent's mother and brother and surviving victim Kris to speak under Marsy's Law. The court acknowledged reading Heinzel's papers and character letters but denied the petition, explaining that while it had discretion, it leaned heavily on how the victims still felt and did not believe granting relief would be a proper use of its discretion.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal first held that the People's argument, raised for the first time on appeal, that Heinzel was ineligible because she lacked the required fire camp certification was forfeited. The People never contested eligibility in the trial court, even when defense counsel raised the certification issue and the court said it was not concerned about it; under People v. Smith, the forfeiture rule applies to the People as well as defendants.
On Heinzel's claim that the court erred in treating victim statements as constitutionally required by Marsy's Law, the court declined to resolve the constitutional question. Heinzel failed to show prejudice: she did not argue the court would have excluded the statements absent its belief that Marsy's Law required them, nor that allowing them was an abuse of the court's statutory or inherent discretion. The victims had a right to be present, and the prosecutor would have conveyed their views regardless; there was no reasonable probability of a different outcome under the Watson standard.
The court also rejected the claim that the trial court abused its discretion by relying on the victims' statements without meaningfully engaging the statutory factors. Section 1203.4b commits the decision to the trial court's discretion under an interest-of-justice standard permitting consideration of any relevant information. The court had acknowledged reading Heinzel's papers and character letters, and under People v. Woodward the appellate court presumes the trial court engaged in the appropriate analysis; nothing rebutted that presumption. The denial was not arbitrary or capricious given the seriousness of the crimes, Heinzel's training, her flight from the scene, and the lasting impact on the victims.
Key Takeaways
- The People's eligibility challenge to a section 1203.4b petition is forfeited if not raised in the trial court, even when it involves a statutory certification requirement.
- A mistaken belief that Marsy's Law constitutionally requires victim statements at an expungement hearing is not reversible absent prejudice under the Watson reasonable-probability standard.
- A trial court need not mention every arguably pertinent item of evidence or explain its view of each item; appellate courts presume it considered all evidence and applied the law.
- The interest-of-justice standard lets trial courts weigh any relevant information, including the offense circumstances and victim impact, alongside strong rehabilitation evidence.
- A commendable post-conviction record does not entitle a defendant to expungement as of right; the decision remains committed to the trial court's discretion.
Why It Matters
The decision confirms the broad discretion trial courts have over fire camp expungement petitions under section 1203.4b and extends the deferential abuse-of-discretion review of section 1203.4 petitions to that statute. It also confirms the forfeiture rule bars the People from raising eligibility challenges for the first time on appeal.
The court declined to decide whether Marsy's Law gives victims a right to be heard at section 1203.4b hearings, resolving the issue on prejudice grounds; future litigants seeking review of that constitutional question will need a record demonstrating prejudice.
Read the full opinion (PDF) · Court docket