Background
William Ricky Jones II was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder for the shooting death of Raymond Warren. On December 6, 2021, Jones repeatedly asked Warren whether he had been involved in the death of Jones's father, who was killed before Jones was born. Despite Warren's denials that he had any role, Jones shot him twice at a friend's apartment in Barstow. Jones fled the scene but turned himself in to police the next day; when told he was under arrest for murder, he responded, 'He was my best friend.'
Jones testified in his own defense, claiming he shot Warren in self-defense after Warren grabbed him and reached for what Jones believed was a weapon. The jury rejected that account, convicted Jones of first-degree murder, and found true the allegation that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing death. The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 50 years to life: 25 years to life for the murder plus a consecutive 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement under Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (d).
On appeal, Jones raised two claims: that the trial court erred in overruling his objections under Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7 to the prosecutor's peremptory challenges to three prospective jurors from cognizable groups, and that the court abused its discretion in admitting his statement to the arresting officer.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal affirmed, rejecting both claims. Reviewing the denial of the section 231.7 objections de novo, the court upheld the trial court's rulings. The prosecutor struck Prospective Juror No. 76, a Hispanic male whose questionnaire showed he did not understand the duty to follow the law and be fair and impartial; Prospective Juror No. 66, an African-American woman who violated the court's admonition by approaching defense counsel; and Prospective Juror No. 33, a Hispanic male who said he would consider punishment, would put himself in the defendant's shoes, and would consider the defendant's race.
The court found the prosecutor's reasons were not presumptively invalid under section 231.7, subdivisions (e) or (g), but instead reflected legitimate concerns about each juror's ability to follow instructions, be impartial, and obey court orders. The trial court properly weighed the totality of the circumstances and correctly found no substantial likelihood that an objectively reasonable person would view race or ethnicity as a factor in the challenges; the prosecutor had also struck two White male jurors for the same violation of court orders, undermining any inference of discriminatory motive.
On the evidentiary claim, the court held that Jones forfeited review by failing to object when the statement was admitted at trial. His later objection to the CALCRIM No. 357 adoptive-admissions instruction came too late. Under Evidence Code section 353, subdivision (a), reversal for erroneous admission of evidence requires a timely and specific objection, so the claim was not cognizable on appeal.
Key Takeaways
- Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7 requires courts to decide whether there is a substantial likelihood that an objectively reasonable person would view a juror's protected status as a factor in a peremptory challenge.
- Challenges based on a juror's ability to follow the law, be fair and impartial, or comply with court orders are not presumptively invalid under section 231.7, even when the juror belongs to a cognizable group.
- Striking jurors of different races for the same misconduct, such as violating court orders, undermines any inference of discriminatory motive.
- Under Evidence Code section 353, subdivision (a), a defendant forfeits appellate review of admitted evidence by failing to make a timely and specific objection at trial.
- Objecting later to a jury instruction on how the jury should consider evidence does not preserve a challenge to that evidence's admissibility.
Why It Matters
The decision applies California's section 231.7 framework, effective for criminal trials beginning January 1, 2022, which replaced the prima facie requirement of the traditional Batson/Wheeler framework with an objective-observer substantial-likelihood test informed by the history of unconscious bias and discrimination in jury selection.
It also underscores the strict forfeiture rules of Evidence Code section 353: counsel must make timely, specific objections when evidence is offered, because objecting at the jury-instruction stage cannot undo an admission that occurred without objection.
Read the full opinion (PDF) · Court docket