Background
T.H. sought to adopt his stepson, who had lived with T.H. and the child’s mother since 2021. The mother consented, but biological father C.J.W. objected. Father had last seen the child at the child’s first birthday in June 2021. A protective order later barred Father from contacting Mother, T.H., and the child until July 2023. A paternity order allowed supervised parenting time at Mother’s discretion but expressly recognized that the protective order controlled while it remained effective.
After the protective order expired, Father did not promptly seek parenting time through the paternity court. T.H. filed the adoption petition in November 2024, alleging that Father’s consent was unnecessary because, for at least a year and without justifiable cause, Father had failed to communicate significantly with the child when able. Following a bifurcated consent hearing, the trial court agreed. At the later best-interest phase, evidence showed that T.H. had acted as the child’s father figure for nearly the child’s entire life, the child regarded him as a parent, and the child had a close relationship with a younger half-sibling.
The case also raised a novel statutory question. T.H. had a June 2020 Level 5 felony criminal-recklessness conviction. Indiana law prevents a court from granting an adoption when a petitioner has a listed nonwaivable conviction within the immediately preceding five years. The conviction was less than five years old when T.H. filed the petition but more than five years old when the trial court heard the remaining evidence and granted the adoption in April 2026.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeals affirmed. Judge DeBoer held that the five-year criminal-history period is measured when the court grants the adoption, not when the petition is filed. Indiana Code section 31-19-11-1 regulates the court’s authority to grant a decree after it has heard the evidence. Its criminal-history subsection relates directly to the elements the court must find at final judgment. The statute does not say that a person with a still-recent conviction cannot file a petition, and other adoption provisions expressly refer to the filing date when the General Assembly intends that date to control.
Background-check provisions did not change the result. Those statutes ensure that the court receives the information needed to assess eligibility; they do not independently establish a filing-date cutoff. In this case, the criminal-history report itself was filed after the five-year anniversary. Although Father argued that a fixed earlier date would prevent eligibility from turning on litigation speed, the panel declined to rewrite the unambiguous statute on policy grounds. T.H.’s conviction therefore did not prohibit the decree.
The panel also upheld the ruling that Father’s consent was unnecessary. Mother reasonably concealed her location and cut off contact while the protective order was active given evidence of abuse and threats. But after it expired in July 2023, Father described no meaningful attempt to communicate or obtain supervised visits before the adoption petition was filed more than a year later. His asserted visitation efforts began only after the petition, and post-petition conduct could not erase the completed statutory period. Lack of legal training or resources did not require a contrary finding where the paternity action remained available.
Finally, adoption served the child’s best interest. The trial court considered T.H.’s old conviction and marital difficulties but found that he had pursued mental-health treatment and that the couple was addressing its problems. The record supported stability, daily care, a strong parent-child bond, and preservation of the sibling relationship. Father acknowledged that he had not supplied comparable consistency.
Key Takeaways
- Indiana’s five-year bar for specified adoption-petitioner convictions is measured when the court grants the adoption, not when the petition is filed.
- Mandatory criminal-history checks supply eligibility evidence but do not create a separate filing-date disqualification.
- A protective order can justify noncommunication while effective, but a parent must act after it expires if lawful channels for contact or court relief are available.
- Efforts begun after an adoption petition generally do not defeat an already completed one-year period of unjustified failure to communicate.
Why It Matters
This decision resolves an important timing issue for Indiana adoption practitioners. A petitioner approaching the end of a five-year statutory disqualification need not necessarily wait to file, but the court cannot grant the adoption until the conviction falls outside the lookback period and all other requirements are established. Counsel should distinguish filing eligibility, background-check timing, and the court’s authority to enter the decree.
The consent analysis also underscores the importance of a documented timeline. Protective orders, paternity orders, attempted contacts, requests for supervised visits, and motions seeking enforcement should be dated precisely. Safety-based barriers may establish justifiable cause during one period without excusing inaction indefinitely after those barriers end.