Background
A jury convicted Justin Marquardt of Level 4 felony child molesting, Level 4 felony incest, and Level 5 felony attempted obstruction of justice. The evidence described repeated sexual abuse of his daughter while she was a child, within a household marked by violence and coercive discipline. The victim initially denied abuse during a 2020 investigation but disclosed it years later, explaining that she had feared punishment, family instability, and violence.
The obstruction charge arose from Marquardt’s effort to influence another adult witness concerning the criminal proceeding. On appeal, he argued that the evidence did not prove obstruction because the State had not shown coercion. He also challenged the sufficiency of the molesting and incest evidence, asserted that those two convictions punished the same conduct in violation of Indiana substantive double-jeopardy law, and requested revision of his aggregate twenty-eight-year sentence.
The appeal required the Court of Appeals to construe Indiana Code section 35-44.1-2-2 after a 2022 legislative amendment. It also required application of the three-step framework from Wadle v. State, which Indiana courts use when one act or transaction is alleged to violate multiple criminal statutes with common elements.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeals affirmed every conviction. Senior Judge Najam explained that the current obstruction statute’s subsections (a) and (b) define separate levels of obstruction with their own conduct and culpability requirements. Before 2022, subsection (b) expressly referred back to the offense described in subsection (a). The General Assembly removed that connecting language. As a result, the State prosecuting Level 5 felony obstruction under subsection (b)(3) did not also have to establish all elements of subsection (a), including coercion.
The relevant question was whether Marquardt attempted unlawfully to influence or persuade a witness. Giving those words their ordinary meanings and considering related obstruction precedent, the panel held that the evidence permitted that finding. Marquardt used an intermediary to urge a witness whose cooperation mattered to alter how the witness dealt with police and prosecutors. Coercion was not an element of the charged post-amendment offense, and the attempt evidence was sufficient.
The molesting and incest convictions also survived sufficiency review. The victim’s testimony described repeated acts and supplied evidence for each statutory element. Indiana appellate courts do not reweigh credibility, and delayed disclosure or prior denial did not make the testimony legally insufficient. The jury was entitled to assess the victim’s explanation for her earlier silence and to consider the corroborating circumstances.
Under Wadle, the charged offenses created a presumptive double-jeopardy concern because one could be factually included in the other as charged. But the trial evidence showed separate acts supporting the two convictions, rebutting that presumption. The panel also rejected Marquardt’s request to infer from the jury’s failure to reach verdicts on other molesting counts that jurors necessarily relied on the same act for both convictions. A non-verdict does not reveal the jury’s factual reasoning and cannot support that inference.
Finally, the twenty-eight-year sentence was not inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B). The repeated exploitation of a child, the long-term consequences described in the record, the abuse of a parental position, and the later effort to affect a witness weighed heavily in the assessment of both the offenses and Marquardt’s character.
Key Takeaways
- After the 2022 amendment, subsections (a) and (b) of Indiana’s obstruction statute state separate offenses; a subsection (b) prosecution need not import subsection (a)’s coercion element.
- Unlawfully influencing or persuading a witness may support Level 5 obstruction even without threats or force when the evidence shows an improper attempt to alter cooperation with authorities.
- A presumptive Wadle violation can be rebutted by evidence that the jury had distinct criminal acts available to support the two convictions.
- An appellate court will not infer the factual basis of convictions from a jury’s inability to reach a verdict on separate counts.
Why It Matters
The statutory construction is the opinion’s most immediate value for Indiana criminal practitioners. Charging instruments, jury instructions, and sufficiency arguments should reflect the General Assembly’s decision to sever subsection (b) from subsection (a). Treating coercion as universally required for obstruction after the 2022 amendment would add language the legislature removed.
The double-jeopardy discussion is equally practical. Prosecutors should present and distinguish the separate acts supporting overlapping offenses, while defense counsel should focus the charging language and trial record on any genuine ambiguity about the unit of prosecution. Neither side should assume that a hung count reveals which evidence jurors used elsewhere. The decision reinforces that the Wadle analysis turns on statutory text, the charges as framed, and the actual evidence of distinct conduct.