Background
Petitioners 1–10 are members of the Abu Mahsan family, a Bedouin shepherd family living in tents in the northern Jordan Valley who support themselves through sheep herding, milking, and cheese production. Petitioner 11 is the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI). On May 25, 2026, at 5:30 a.m., Israeli soldiers and Border Police arrived at the family’s encampment and seized — on suspicion of unlawful entry into a designated firing zone — a private vehicle belonging to the first petitioner, two water trailers (of three and four cubic meters respectively), and the tractor used to tow them. This was done pursuant to Section 60 of the Order Regarding Security Provisions [Consolidated Version] (Judea and Samaria) (No. 1651), 5770-2009 (the Security Order). The family was left with a single container holding roughly one cubic meter of water, designated for livestock only. Because the encampment has no connection to water infrastructure, the family relied entirely on self-transport from neighboring villages for their water and food supply.
ACRI wrote to the Head of the Civil Administration on May 25 and again on May 26 demanding return of the equipment, arguing the family had been left without the means for basic subsistence; neither letter received a response. Informal contacts were also made with the IDF Spokesperson, the Chief of Staff, and the Jordan Valley Brigade Commander. The IDF Spokesperson’s reply confirmed that the early-morning operation seized vehicles, tractors, and water trailers “in order to protect firing zones,” while “leaving the humanitarian minimum.” On May 28, 2026, the petitioners filed the present petition before the High Court of Justice, requesting both return of the confiscated equipment and, in the interim, an order requiring the respondents to supply the family with water, food, and regular transportation.
In their preliminary response, the respondents argued for threshold dismissal on grounds of prematurity and non-exhaustion of remedies. They noted that Amendment No. 93 to the Security Order, which entered into force on February 3, 2026, added Section 62b establishing a dedicated administrative track for release, objection, and review of goods seized under Section 60 outside of criminal proceedings. The deputy director of the inspection unit had, on June 3, 2026, set conditions for release of the seized goods: payment of seizure costs of NIS 26,198; signing a two-year undertaking not to use the goods for further violations; posting a monetary bond; and a prohibition on entering Firing Zone 901 without a permit. The petitioners contended those conditions were impossible to meet and that their main relief — provision of basic necessities — was a freestanding obligation independent of the objection process. They also reported that Petitioner 2 had been hospitalized for dehydration since the petition was filed.
The Court’s Holding
Writing for a unanimous three-judge panel (Justices Kasher, Stein, and Canfy-Steinitz), Justice Yechiel Kasher dismissed the petition on the threshold ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The court reaffirmed the well-established principle that the High Court of Justice will not entertain a petition where an effective alternative remedy exists, and particularly where a specific statutory objection or appeal channel has been established for the type of administrative decision being challenged, citing prior HCJ authority including HCJ 683/23 and HCJ 6043/20.
The court found that Section 62b of the Security Order provides exactly such a detailed statutory track: the owner of seized goods may apply to the director or deputy director of the inspection unit for their release; that decision may then be challenged before the Head of the Civil Administration, after receiving a recommendation from the committee for the examination of goods seized outside criminal proceedings. This mechanism was designed to govern disputes of precisely the kind presented here, and the petitioners were required to exhaust it before approaching the High Court.
The court rejected the petitioners’ argument that their primary relief — a mandatory order to supply water, food, and transportation — was legally independent of the seizure and therefore not subject to the exhaustion requirement. The court characterized this framing as an attempt to circumvent the Section 62b objection process, noting that the petition arose directly and entirely from the confiscation. While acknowledging the hardships described, including the hospitalization of one petitioner, the court held that all such arguments — including humanitarian and proportionality claims — could and should be raised before the Head of the Civil Administration in the objection proceedings, and expressed confidence that those arguments would be heard “with an open heart and willing spirit and given their full proper weight.” No order for costs was made.
Key Takeaways
- The High Court of Justice will dismiss a petition on non-exhaustion grounds even when the petitioner frames the primary relief as something broader than reversal of the underlying administrative act, if the petition in substance arises from and is inseparable from that act.
- Amendment No. 93 to the Security Order (Judea and Samaria), effective February 3, 2026, created a detailed statutory track under Section 62b for administrative review of goods seized under Section 60 outside criminal proceedings; parties must exhaust this two-tier process (inspection-unit director, then Head of the Civil Administration) before petitioning the HCJ.
- Humanitarian arguments — including deprivation of water, food, and transportation — do not, by themselves, create a bypass to the exhaustion requirement; they remain cognizable claims to be raised within the designated administrative forum.
- The court left open no ruling on the merits of the petitioners’ international humanitarian law, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, or proportionality arguments, all of which await the administrative proceedings.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the HCJ’s consistent insistence on exhaustion of administrative remedies in West Bank military-administration matters, even where petitioners allege acute humanitarian deprivation. By expressly describing the petitioners’ “independent duty” framing as an attempt to circumvent the new Section 62b mechanism, the court signals that creative pleading will not substitute for use of the dedicated statutory track that the military legislator has put in place. Practitioners and civil-rights organizations operating in the West Bank should treat Amendment No. 93’s objection procedure as a mandatory gateway before HCJ intervention will be considered.
At the same time, the opinion leaves the substantive questions — whether the seizure of an off-grid community’s sole water-transport capacity constitutes a violation of international humanitarian law or the Basic Law, and whether enforcement in firing zones is being carried out selectively — entirely unresolved. The case may therefore return to the High Court if the administrative objection process fails to provide adequate relief, potentially generating significant precedent on the limits of property seizure powers in the occupied territories.