Background
The fifteen applicants — identified only as “Ploni” (anonymous) and described as family members and residents of the Palestinian Authority territories — filed an administrative petition in the Tel Aviv-Jaffa District Court on 24 July 2025. They sought two remedies: prevention of their expulsion from Israel, and recognition of permanent residency status. Their core claim was that they face serious threats inside Palestinian Authority areas because they are suspected of having collaborated with Israeli security forces. They alleged that the Palestinian Authority had convicted them of collaboration offenses, and that Hamas had issued proclamations targeting them.
Alongside the petition, the applicants had submitted requests to the Committee for Examining Claims of Threats Due to Collaboration with the State of Israel (the “Threatened Persons Committee”), the dedicated administrative body for evaluating such claims. They attached a November 2024 application to that committee. On 17 September 2025, the District Court struck out the petition but ordered that the committee respond to the applicants by 26 October 2025 and that, in the interim, the applicants not be removed from Israel. Because the committee repeatedly failed to respond, the stay of expulsion was extended twice — by Deputy President A. Cohen — reaching a final extended deadline of 26 January 2026.
On 25 January 2026, the applicants sought yet another extension. The following day the committee filed a response stating that it had informed the applicants they must supply additional particulars before their claims could be evaluated, and argued that the stay should therefore expire so that the administrative process could run its course without court interference. On 27 January 2026, Deputy President A. Yakoel (who has since passed away) denied the extension request in substance, but extended the stay briefly until 29 January 2026 to allow the applicants time to seek interim relief directly from the Threatened Persons Committee and to prepare a new petition if warranted.
The Court’s Holding
Justice Daphne Barak-Erez denied the petition for leave to appeal without calling for a response from the Ministry of Defense. She applied the well-established restrictive standard governing leave to appeal decisions on interim relief, citing two recent Supreme Court decisions in analogous matters: בר”מ 72438-03-26 (31 March 2026) and בר”מ 82605-05-26 (28 May 2026), both involving the Threatened Persons Committee. She concluded that the applicants had not identified special reasons sufficient to overcome that high threshold.
The Court affirmed the District Court’s reasoning: the proper course is for the applicants to exhaust the administrative process before the Threatened Persons Committee, including by applying to that committee for interim protective relief. Should those efforts prove insufficient, they remain free to file a fresh administrative petition in the District Court. Justice Barak-Erez expressly declined to express any view on the merits of the underlying claims.
The ancillary request for an interim order filed on 26 February 2026 was also denied as a consequence of the dismissal of the leave petition. No order as to costs was made, given that no response had been solicited from the other side.
Key Takeaways
- The standard for granting leave to appeal an interim-relief decision in administrative proceedings is narrow; applicants must demonstrate special reasons beyond disagreement with the lower court’s balancing of interests.
- Courts will direct parties claiming threats arising from collaboration with Israel to exhaust remedies before the Threatened Persons Committee — including applying for interim relief within that administrative framework — before resorting to judicial intervention.
- A committee response requesting additional information, even if characterised by applicants as perfunctory, will not by itself persuade the Supreme Court to grant leave to appeal the expiry of a stay of expulsion.
- Exhaustion of administrative remedies is treated as a prerequisite, not a technicality, even where applicants face serious personal security allegations.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the boundary between the judicial and administrative tracks for Palestinians who claim they face persecution because of alleged cooperation with Israeli authorities. The Threatened Persons Committee exists precisely to evaluate such claims, and Israeli courts — including the Supreme Court — are unwilling to bypass that mechanism through extended judicial stays, even after a committee has been slow to respond. The ruling signals that delays by the committee are not, on their own, sufficient grounds for continuous court-supervised protection absent a finding that the administrative avenue is genuinely unavailable or futile.
The case also illustrates the procedural channelling function of the restrictive leave-to-appeal standard in interim-relief matters. By citing two prior 2026 Supreme Court decisions involving the same committee, Justice Barak-Erez signals that this is an established pattern, not an isolated ruling, giving future litigants in similar circumstances clear guidance that they must work through the committee process before seeking Supreme Court intervention.