Background
The Massachusetts Appeals Court vacated an abuse-prevention order based on “coercive control,” holding that vague testimony about threatened disclosure of private sexual information did not supply the objective evidence required by the newly expanded statute. The panel did not minimize the sensitivity of the allegations. It held that a court must develop a sufficiently specific record to decide both what conduct occurred and how that conduct caused reasonable fear of physical harm or reduced physical safety or autonomy.
The case began when V.B. sought a harassment-prevention order under Chapter 258E in May 2025. At the scheduled hearing, B.W.R.T. did not appear, and a judge instead issued an ex parte abuse-prevention order under Chapter 209A. At a later two-party hearing, V.B. disclaimed physical violence and threats of violence. She testified that her former partner repeatedly threatened to tell family members personal information she had disclosed during their relationship and had communicated that a “vendetta” was underway.
The hearing judge deliberately avoided asking V.B. to describe the sensitive information in detail. Based on her general account, the judge found a pattern of threats to communicate sensitive information and extended the order under the coercive-control provision added to Chapter 209A by the 2024 legislation effective September 18, 2024. B.W.R.T. appealed, arguing that the evidence did not satisfy the statutory definition and raising other challenges to the order.
The Court’s Holding
The Appeals Court ruled that the record was legally insufficient. Chapter 209A now defines abuse to include coercive control between family or household members. The definition identifies conduct including threatening to publish sensitive personal information, but the statute also requires conduct that causes the protected person reasonably to fear physical harm or to have a reduced sense of physical safety or autonomy. Before imposing the statute’s potent remedies, a court needs objective evidence allowing it to apply each part of that language.
Here, the judge had only elliptical references to communication that was “private” and “sexual in nature.” The panel recognized that the judge acted sensitively by discouraging disclosure of intimate details, but that approach left the underlying facts too conclusory for judicial evaluation. The court could not determine whether the information was sensitive within the statutory meaning, the precise nature of the threatened conduct, or how the conduct met the required effect on physical safety or autonomy. A plaintiff bears the burden to establish abuse by a preponderance of the evidence, and privacy concerns cannot eliminate the factual showing necessary for relief.
The panel also flagged, without deciding, the breadth of the coercive-control definition. It noted that the Supreme Judicial Court had requested amicus briefs in a pending case concerning whether the provision is unconstitutionally vague or overbroad under federal and Massachusetts constitutional protections. Because the evidence was insufficient under the statute itself, the Appeals Court expressed no view on those constitutional questions and did not reach B.W.R.T.’s remaining arguments. It vacated the June 11, 2025 order.
Key Takeaways
- A coercive-control order requires a concrete record identifying the challenged conduct and connecting it to reasonable fear of physical harm or reduced physical safety or autonomy.
- A threat to disclose private information may fall within Chapter 209A, but conclusory labels such as “private” or “sexual” do not by themselves prove the statutory elements.
- Judges can protect sensitive information through careful questioning and courtroom procedures, but sensitivity cannot substitute for the objective evidence needed to issue an order.
- The Appeals Court left unresolved the broader constitutional challenge to the 2024 coercive-control provision, which was pending before the Supreme Judicial Court.
Why It Matters
This is useful early guidance for Massachusetts family-law and domestic-violence practitioners applying a major 2024 statutory change. Applicants and counsel should present enough detail to establish what was threatened, the context and pattern of the conduct, and its concrete effect on safety or autonomy. Respondents should test each statutory element while avoiding unnecessary public exposure of intimate information. Judges may need sealed materials, focused questions, or other protective procedures to create a reviewable record without compounding the alleged harm.
The decision is an unreported Rule 23.0 ruling and therefore persuasive, not binding. Even so, it identifies the evidentiary discipline likely to matter while appellate courts define coercive control. The provision reaches nonphysical conduct that older abuse-prevention doctrine might not have covered, but V.B. shows that its breadth does not erase proof requirements. For litigants, the central task is translating a disturbing pattern into specific facts and then tying those facts to the precise statutory consequences.