- Court
- New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department
- Case
- Matter of Alatriste v. New York City Dept. of Probation
- Docket
- 2022-04158
- Filed
- May 27, 2026
- Slip Op
- 2026 NY Slip Op 03302
- Citation
- 2026 NY Slip Op 03302 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2026)
Background
Alexander Alatriste commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking, in effect, a writ of mandamus to compel a Justice of the Supreme Court, Richmond County, to grant his application for a certificate of relief from disabilities pursuant to Correction Law § 702. The proceeding was brought against the New York City Department of Probation, the City of New York, and the Supreme Court Justice who denied the application. The Supreme Court, Richmond County granted the respondents’ motions to dismiss the petition under CPLR 3211(a)(7) and 7804(f), denied the petition, and dismissed the proceeding.
Alatriste appealed, challenging the dismissal of his effort to compel the issuance of a certificate of relief from disabilities — a certificate that, if granted, removes certain statutory bars to employment, licensure, and other benefits that arise from a criminal conviction.
Holding
The Appellate Division, Second Department dismissed the appeal, vacated the order and judgment of the Supreme Court, and then — treating the appeal as an original application — denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding on the merits. The court’s analysis turned on a fundamental jurisdictional defect: a CPLR article 78 proceeding naming a Supreme Court Justice as a respondent must be commenced in the Appellate Division, not the Supreme Court, pursuant to CPLR 7804(b) and CPLR 506(b)(1). Because the proceeding was brought in the wrong court, the Supreme Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and its order had to be vacated.
However, the court exercised its authority to consider the appeal as if it were an original application to the Appellate Division. On the merits, the court found that the petitioner failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to the relief sought. The remedy of mandamus lies “only to compel the performance of a ministerial act, and only where there exists a clear legal right to the relief sought.” The issuance of a certificate of relief from disabilities under Correction Law § 702 involves the exercise of judicial discretion, not a ministerial act, and Alatriste did not establish the prerequisites for mandamus relief.
Takeaways
This decision provides important guidance on two distinct legal issues. First, practitioners must be mindful of the venue requirements for article 78 proceedings. When a Supreme Court Justice is named as a respondent, the proceeding must be commenced in the Appellate Division. Filing in the wrong court constitutes a jurisdictional defect that results in vacatur of any orders issued by the court. This rule exists because the Supreme Court cannot exercise review authority over one of its own justices.
Second, the decision clarifies the limits of mandamus relief in the context of certificates of relief from disabilities. Because the issuance of such a certificate involves judicial discretion — the court must consider the applicant’s rehabilitation, the nature of the offense, and other factors — it is not a ministerial act subject to compulsion through mandamus. A disappointed applicant’s remedy lies in other procedural avenues, not in compelling the judge to exercise discretion in a particular way.
Why It Matters
For individuals with criminal records seeking certificates of relief from disabilities, this case clarifies the procedural and substantive hurdles they face. The certificate process is discretionary, meaning that a judge’s denial is not easily challenged through article 78 proceedings. While the Appellate Division’s willingness to treat the appeal as an original application demonstrates some flexibility, the merits analysis confirms that the standard for mandamus remains demanding. Practitioners advising clients in this area should focus on building the strongest possible application at the trial level rather than relying on post-denial judicial review.