- Court
- New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department
- Case
- Madeo v. Singh
- Docket
- 2022-01436, 2022-04001, 2022-04003
- Filed
- May 27, 2026
- Slip Op
- 2026 NY Slip Op 03298
- Citation
- 2026 NY Slip Op 03298 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2026)
Background
Debra Madeo commenced a personal injury action against Rajbir Singh arising from a motor vehicle accident. Singh failed to appear or answer the complaint, and in August 2020, the Supreme Court, Queens County granted Madeo’s unopposed motion for leave to enter a default judgment and scheduled an inquest on damages. Prior to the inquest, Singh moved pursuant to CPLR 317 to vacate the default, but the court denied the motion in January 2022.
After the inquest on damages, the court determined that Madeo sustained a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) and directed entry of a judgment in her favor in the principal sum of $500,000. Singh then filed two additional motions: one under CPLR 5015(a)(3) to vacate the default for failure to state a cause of action, and another challenging whether Madeo had actually established a serious injury at the inquest. The Supreme Court denied both motions, and Singh appealed from all three orders.
Holding
The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed the denial of Singh’s CPLR 317 motion to vacate the default and the denial of his CPLR 5015(a)(3) motion. However, the court modified the first order entered April 20, 2022, by granting Singh’s motion to dismiss on the ground that Madeo failed to establish at the inquest that she sustained a serious injury under Insurance Law § 5102(d). As a result, the court vacated the $500,000 judgment.
The court explained that even in a default judgment posture, a plaintiff in a motor vehicle accident case must establish that the injuries meet the serious injury threshold under the no-fault law. At an inquest following a default, the defaulting defendant’s liability is established, but the plaintiff must still prove damages — including the threshold requirement that the injuries constitute a “serious injury” as defined by statute. The court found that Madeo’s evidence at the inquest was insufficient to meet this burden.
Takeaways
This decision highlights a critical but sometimes overlooked aspect of default judgment practice in no-fault automobile accident cases. A default establishes the defendant’s liability, but it does not relieve the plaintiff of the obligation to prove that the injuries satisfy the serious injury threshold of Insurance Law § 5102(d). This means that at an inquest on damages, the plaintiff must present competent medical evidence demonstrating that the injuries fall within one of the statutory categories of serious injury — such as significant limitation of use of a body function or system, or a medically determined injury that prevented the plaintiff from performing substantially all daily activities for at least 90 of the 180 days following the accident.
The decision also illustrates the limited scope of CPLR 317, which provides an alternative basis for vacating a default when the defendant was not personally served and did not actually receive notice of the summons in time to defend. The court affirmed the denial of Singh’s CPLR 317 motion, suggesting that the procedural requirements were not met.
Practitioners representing defaulting defendants should consider challenging the serious injury threshold even when the default cannot be vacated, as this avenue may prove more fruitful than the default vacatur motion itself.
Why It Matters
For personal injury practitioners in New York, this case serves as an important reminder that the no-fault serious injury threshold applies at all stages of litigation, including inquests following default judgments. A plaintiff who obtains a default judgment cannot simply present evidence of injuries without satisfying the specific requirements of Insurance Law § 5102(d). Even a $500,000 judgment can be vacated if the plaintiff’s proof at the inquest is deficient on the serious injury question. Defense attorneys should be alert to this potential basis for relief, even when conventional default vacatur motions fail.