Background
Rodrigo Arias was injured when he fell from a ladder while working on a barn at residential property in Pound Ridge. He sued property owner Allen J. Reyen and Allen J. Reyen, Inc., alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6). Section 240(1), commonly called the Scaffold Law, imposes a nondelegable elevation-safety duty on owners, contractors, and their agents. Section 241(6) similarly imposes a nondelegable duty to comply with specific Industrial Code safety rules.
The defendants separately sought summary judgment. The corporate defendant argued that it was not an owner, general contractor, or statutory agent for Arias’s work. Reyen invoked the statutory exemption for owners of one- and two-family dwellings who contract for work but do not direct or control it.
Supreme Court dismissed the §§ 240(1) and 241(6) claims against both defendants. Arias appealed, placing two recurring Scaffold Law questions before the Second Department: when a business connected to the homeowner has enough authority to count as a contractor or agent, and whether work on a separate barn retains a sufficiently residential purpose for the homeowner exemption.
The Court’s Holding
The Second Department affirmed. As to the corporation, the evidence established that it did not own the premises and was neither the general contractor nor the owner’s agent for Arias’s work. Statutory-agent status turns on delegated authority to supervise and control the injury-producing work, not merely a business or personal relationship with the owner. Arias did not raise a factual dispute on that point.
Reyen also established the homeowner exemption. He showed that the premises were used as a qualifying residence, that he did not direct or control Arias’s work, and that the project served the residential use of the property. The panel treated the barn as an extension of the dwelling and concluded that the work had a substantially residential purpose.
The result confirms that a physically separate structure does not automatically make a project commercial for Labor Law purposes. The inquiry remains functional and fact-specific: courts examine how the structure relates to the home, the purpose of the work, and whether the owner exercised construction-direction authority beyond ordinary homeowner involvement.
Key Takeaways
- The one- and two-family homeowner exemption can cover work on a barn when the structure functions as an extension of the residence and the project is substantially residential.
- Ownership or affiliation alone does not make a related company a Labor Law contractor or agent; delegated authority over the work is essential.
- Summary-judgment records should address property use, project purpose, supervision, contracting roles, and the owner’s actual communications with workers.
Why It Matters
Scaffold Law exposure can be outcome-determinative for New York owners, contractors, insurers, and the plaintiffs’ bar because liability under § 240(1) is not governed by ordinary comparative-negligence principles. Arias gives residential-property defendants a concrete application of the exemption beyond work performed inside the dwelling itself.
The opinion should not be read as a categorical barn exception. Mixed residential and commercial uses, rental activity, or evidence that an owner directed the means and methods may change the analysis. Practitioners should develop those facts early rather than relying on labels such as “homeowner,” “barn,” or “family business.”