The Second Department held that a homeowner waiver lacked unmistakable negligence language and could not override the Scaffold Law’s nondelegable safety duty.
The Second Department held that the Scaffold Law’s homeowner exemption covered ladder work on a barn that functioned as an extension of a residence and served a substantially residential purpose.
Second Department affirms denial of property owners’ motion to dismiss Labor Law § 240(1) and § 241(6) claims arising from worker’s elevation-related injury during renovation — Scaffold Law claims survive CPLR 3211 and must be addressed through discovery.
The First Department affirms summary judgment for a stone mechanic struck by a 350-pound falling panel, holding that all four defendants — including a post-merger associate, a lobby condominium, and a building manager who contracted for the work — qualify as owners or statutory agents under Labor Law § 240(1).
The First Department upholds Labor Law § 241(6) liability for rainwater and oil on a construction floor, while affirming dismissal of § 240(1) where the concrete form being lifted never fell or moved uncontrollably. Post-Bazdaric, defendants must show the hazardous substance was inherent to the specific task.
Second Department reverses § 240(1) summary judgment where worker struck by unknown object from upper scaffold: plaintiff must identify the object and show it was being hoisted or required securing.
Second Department affirms Labor Law § 240(1) liability where worker was directed to climb a seven-foot stack of doors without a ladder, and upholds CPLR 3126 preclusion of an undisclosed defense witness.
The First Department affirms partial summary judgment under the Scaffold Law, holding that terra cotta coping used as a suspended scaffold anchor point is subject to Labor Law § 240(1)’s absolute liability standard when it dislodges and strikes a worker below.
The First Department affirms summary judgment under Labor Law § 240(1) where workers manually lowered a heavy metal switchgear without a hoist—even though hoisting equipment had been used on prior days—and the top of the switchgear fell on the plaintiff with enough force to crack his hard hat.
The First Department affirms Labor Law § 240(1) liability against the Bronx construction site owner and contractor while granting summary judgment on common-law negligence against the materials supplier whose forklift operator dropped sheetrock on the plaintiff—and conditionally grants contractual indemnification cross-claims through the construction chain.
The Appellate Division, First Department modified a multi-party construction accident ruling, addressing Labor Law § 240(1), § 241(6), and § 200 claims alongside complex third-party indemnification issues including the anti-subrogation doctrine and the Workers’ Compensation Law § 11 grave-injury bar.
The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed denial of a construction worker’s partial summary judgment on Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) Scaffold Law claims, finding the foreman’s testimony that plaintiff was instructed to use a scissor lift — not a ladder — created a triable recalcitrant-worker defense.
The First Department reversed a ruling that dismissed an owner and general contractor’s third-party indemnification claims against a subcontractor, holding that a default judgment against defendants is not a merits finding of 100% negligence and does not preclude them from seeking contractual or common-law indemnification from the subcontractor that employed the injured worker.
The First Department reversed and granted plaintiff summary judgment on liability under Labor Law § 240(1) after his testimony that an eight-foot A-frame ladder moved from side to side and caused him to fall while installing sheetrock — rejecting the owner’s argument that contrary hearsay in post-accident reports raised a triable issue.
The Appellate Division, First Department, affirms summary judgment for a construction worker who fell when a ladder shifted rapidly, holding that contradictory testimony about the manner of descent is immaterial under Labor Law § 240(1) and that descending a ladder facing away from the rungs constitutes comparative negligence — not a sole-proximate-cause defense — to the Scaffold Law’s absolute liability.
The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed denial of a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss, holding that a pre-litigation covenant not to sue did not “clearly and unequivocally” release the defendant from its own negligence and therefore could not bar the plaintiff’s Labor Law §§ 200, 240(1), and 241(6) claims.
The Appellate Division, Second Department reversed a plaintiff’s Labor Law § 240(1) summary judgment after defendants raised a triable issue of fact on the sole-proximate-cause defense, showing that a six-foot ladder was available but that the carpenter chose to use scissor clamps on a cement column instead.
The Appellate Division, First Department unanimously affirmed Labor Law §241(6) liability for a construction worker who slipped on a snow-covered staircase, and held that joint-venture partners and investor entities with site-management authority qualify as ‘owners’ subject to strict Scaffold Law liability.
First Department affirms Labor Law § 240(1) summary judgment and rejects a Workers’ Compensation exclusivity defense, holding that shared insurance and the same building location do not prove alter ego status between a property owner, manager, and general contractor.
First Department affirms Labor Law § 240(1) summary judgment for a plumber injured when an extension ladder slid, holding that trips to retrieve materials for ongoing work constitute protected ancillary activity under the Scaffold Law.
First Department reinstates a Labor Law § 241(6) claim for a worker who tripped on a floor inlay in a corridor after finding genuine fact issues on whether the space was a ‘passageway’ under the Industrial Code, and holds the integral-to-work doctrine inapplicable absent evidence of active work on the hazard.
First Department affirms Labor Law § 240(1) summary judgment for a sheetrock worker who fell from an unsecured ladder, and holds that a Spanish-language affidavit lacking a translator certification was inadmissible under CPLR 2101(b), taking down all documents it purported to authenticate.