- Court
- New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department
- Case
- Clendeninn v. Young
- Date
- June 3, 2026
- Slip Op. No.
- 2026 NY Slip Op 03421
Background
In December 2019, plaintiff Neil Clendeninn entered into a lease agreement with defendant S.W. Young Property Management as tenant for rental premises on Fire Island, for a term from April 15, 2020 through October 31, 2020. Steven W. Young signed the lease on behalf of the landlord. Plaintiff alleged he was unable to take possession of the property as anticipated due to governmental restrictions in place during the COVID-19 pandemic. He commenced this action seeking to recover advance payments made under the lease, asserting claims for unjust enrichment, “frustration of purpose,” and “impossibility of performance.”
Defendants asserted affirmative defenses that certain individual defendants and entities were not proper parties, and a counterclaim for breach of the lease. Plaintiff moved for summary judgment. Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Linda Kevins, J.), granted plaintiff’s motion and entered judgment in his favor for $32,000. Defendants appealed. During the appeal, the decedent Steven Young died and his estate administrator was substituted.
Holding
The Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed the judgment, on the law, with costs, and denied plaintiff’s summary judgment motion. The Court found multiple errors. First, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in deeming defendants’ statement of material facts admitted for failure to provide a paragraph-by-paragraph response, noting that “blind adherence” to the procedure in 22 NYCRR 202.8-g was not required, citing Argueta v. Hall & Wright, LLC, 230 AD3d 1200, 1201.
More substantively, the Court held that plaintiff failed to establish entitlement to summary judgment on the unjust enrichment claim. The existence of a valid and enforceable lease agreement between the parties barred recovery under that quasi-contractual theory, as unjust enrichment does not lie where there is a binding contract governing the subject matter. Plaintiff also failed to eliminate triable issues of fact regarding frustration of purpose and impossibility of performance—specifically, whether the COVID-19 pandemic restrictions made the rental property completely unusable or merely inconvenient.
Takeaways
This decision is notable for its treatment of COVID-19-related lease disputes. The Court’s analysis signals that tenants cannot automatically recover advance rent payments based on pandemic restrictions without demonstrating that the restrictions completely frustrated the purpose of the lease or made performance truly impossible—as opposed to merely difficult or inconvenient. The existence of a valid lease agreement also bars quasi-contractual recovery under unjust enrichment. Practitioners should also note the Court’s flexible approach to 22 NYCRR 202.8-g compliance, indicating that failure to submit a proper response to a statement of material facts will not automatically result in deemed admissions.
Why It Matters
As courts continue to resolve pandemic-era lease disputes, this case establishes important guardrails. Tenants seeking to recover advance payments must meet the high bar of traditional impossibility or frustration of purpose doctrines, not simply assert that pandemic conditions were unfavorable. Landlords can defend by showing the property remained usable or that the lease allocated the risk of government restrictions. The procedural ruling on 202.8-g provides welcome flexibility for parties who may have technical deficiencies in their summary judgment papers.