- Court
- New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department
- Case
- Graves v. Sava Serbian Orthodox Church
- Date
- June 2, 2026
- Slip Op. No.
- 2026 NY Slip Op 03390
Background
Plaintiff Casandra Harris Graves brought this action after Gregory Graves, an incapacitated person, fell eleven feet through an unprotected opening while working at a construction site. The property was owned by defendant Srpska Istocn-Prvoslavna Crkva Svetoga Save, also known as Serbian Eastern-Orthodox Church of Saint Sava (Saint Sava). G.P.J. O’Donoghue Contracting Corp. (GPJ) was a second third-party defendant brought into the action by Saint Sava. Plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment on her Labor Law section 240(1) claim, and Saint Sava cross-moved for summary judgment on its claims for contractual and common-law indemnification against GPJ. The Supreme Court, New York County, granted plaintiff’s motion, conditionally granted Saint Sava’s contractual indemnification claim against GPJ, but denied Saint Sava’s common-law indemnification claim as academic. Both Saint Sava and GPJ appealed.
Holding
The Appellate Division unanimously modified the order to grant Saint Sava unconditional summary judgment on both its contractual and common-law indemnification claims against GPJ, and otherwise affirmed. The Court held that plaintiff demonstrated prima facie entitlement to partial summary judgment on the Labor Law section 240(1) claim by showing that Gregory Graves fell eleven feet through an unprotected opening, and that neither Saint Sava nor GPJ raised an issue of fact as to whether Graves was the sole proximate cause of the accident. On the indemnification claims, the Court determined that Saint Sava was entitled to unconditional rather than conditional summary judgment on its contractual indemnification claim, and also granted summary judgment on Saint Sava’s common-law indemnification claim, which the trial court had declined to reach.
Takeaways
Under Labor Law section 240(1), a worker who falls through an unprotected opening at a construction site establishes a prima facie case of liability against the property owner, and the owner can only avoid liability by showing the worker was the sole proximate cause of the accident. Where the evidence shows an unprotected opening and a gravity-related fall, the burden shifts decisively to the defendant. On indemnification, when a contractor’s negligence is the sole proximate cause of the underlying accident and the indemnification agreement so provides, the property owner is entitled to unconditional summary judgment on both contractual and common-law indemnification claims.
Why It Matters
This case illustrates the interplay between Labor Law section 240(1) liability and the indemnification framework in construction accident litigation. Property owners who are held strictly liable under section 240(1) will typically seek to shift the financial burden to the contractor whose negligence actually caused the accident. This decision confirms that when the contractor’s negligence is established as the sole proximate cause, the property owner need not await a final determination in the main action before obtaining unconditional indemnification. Contractors and their insurers should be aware that failing to provide adequate fall protection at a construction site exposes them not only to direct liability but also to indemnification obligations that may be resolved on summary judgment.