- Court
- New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department
- Case Name
- Lilly v. State of New York
- Slip Op. No.
- 2026 NY Slip Op 03270
- Decision Date
- May 26, 2026
- Docket No.
- Index No. 155539/24, Appeal No. 6720, Case No. 2025-01852
Background
Keith Lilly, a former employee of New York State Assembly member Edward Gibbs, brought claims for disability discrimination and failure to accommodate under the New York State Human Rights Law (Executive Law Section 296), the New York City Human Rights Law (Administrative Code Section 8-107), and the Family and Medical Leave Act (29 USC Section 2601 et seq.). Lilly alleged that he suffered from diabetes, was hospitalized in July 2023 for treatment of his left foot, and was terminated a few days after informing Gibbs that he would need to remain in the hospital for treatment.
Lilly also asserted causes of action for aiding and abetting disability discrimination under both the State and City Human Rights Laws. Gibbs moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing in part that as a member of the state Assembly, he was not amenable to suit for employment discrimination. Supreme Court (Goetz, J.) denied the motion to dismiss in its entirety, and Gibbs appealed.
Holding
The First Department unanimously modified the order by dismissing the aiding and abetting claims (the third and fifth causes of action) while otherwise affirming the denial of the motion to dismiss.
The court held that at the prediscovery stage, the complaint sufficiently alleged that Gibbs was amenable to suit as an employer for disability discrimination. The court declined to consider Gibbs’s argument that he was not an “employer” under the applicable statutes, as that argument was raised for the first time in his reply papers in Supreme Court.
On the discrimination claims, the court found the complaint stated a prima facie case by linking the disability with the adverse employment action—Lilly was terminated shortly after informing Gibbs of his need for hospitalization. The failure to accommodate claims were also adequately pleaded, as Lilly alleged he informed Gibbs of his need for time off and Gibbs failed to engage in an interactive dialogue. The FMLA interference claim survived because Lilly alleged he was terminated only a few days before he was eligible to take FMLA leave.
However, the aiding and abetting claims were dismissed because Gibbs was the only person alleged to have engaged in discriminatory conduct, and an individual may not be held liable for aiding and abetting his own violations of the human rights laws.
Key Takeaways
- State legislators may be amenable to suit as employers under the State and City Human Rights Laws and the FMLA, at least at the pleading stage.
- Arguments first raised in reply papers are not properly before the court and will not be considered on appeal.
- A prima facie case of disability discrimination can be stated by alleging a temporal link between disclosure of a disability requiring medical treatment and termination.
- FMLA interference may be alleged where termination occurs just before the employee becomes eligible for protected leave, even if formal leave had not yet been requested.
- An individual cannot be held liable for aiding and abetting his own discriminatory conduct under the State and City Human Rights Laws.
Why It Matters
This decision has significant implications for employment law in the public sector, particularly as applied to legislative offices. By declining to dismiss discrimination claims against a sitting Assembly member at the pleading stage, the court signaled that elected officials who serve as employers must comply with the same anti-discrimination obligations as other employers. The ruling also provides a practical reminder about the self-aiding-and-abetting doctrine, which bars claims against a sole alleged discriminator for aiding and abetting his own conduct. Employment law practitioners representing legislative staff should take note that these claims can proceed to discovery even when the employer is an elected official.