Reese v. City of New York

Court
New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department
Case
Reese v. City of New York
Date
June 4, 2026
Slip Op. No.
2026 NY Slip Op 03515

Background

Plaintiff Otis Reese brought suit against the City of New York and individual defendants following a dispute over a settlement reached in the underlying personal injury action filed in Bronx County. During the litigation, settlement conferences were conducted through plaintiff’s counsel-of-record, Sameer Nath, who participated in all such conferences. Plaintiff’s former criminal defense attorney also took part in the negotiations with plaintiff’s knowledge.

Nath ultimately signed a stipulation of settlement on plaintiff’s behalf for $250,000, relying on representations from plaintiff’s former criminal defense attorney that plaintiff would agree to settle for that amount. Plaintiff subsequently moved to vacate the stipulation of settlement, arguing that Nath lacked authority to settle the case. Supreme Court, Bronx County (Myrna Socorro, J.), denied the motion. Plaintiff appealed.

Holding

The Appellate Division, First Department, unanimously affirmed the denial of plaintiff’s motion to vacate the settlement stipulation, without costs. The Court found that plaintiff failed to demonstrate good cause to vacate the stipulation under the standards set forth in Hallock v. State, 64 NY2d 224, 230 (1984), and Matter of Kanter, 209 AD2d 365, 366 (1st Dept 1994).

The panel held that counsel-of-record Nath was cloaked with apparent authority, if not actual authority, to settle the case, having participated in all settlement conferences. The Court relied on Global Bank v. 43 Mott Realty Owner, LLC, 246 AD3d 658, 659 (1st Dept 2026), and Hawkins v. City of New York, 40 AD3d 327 (1st Dept 2007), to support this conclusion. The fact that Nath relied on representations from plaintiff’s former criminal defense attorney did not warrant vacatur, citing Pruss v. Infiniti of Manhattan, Inc., 180 AD3d 163, 168-169 (1st Dept 2020).

Critically, the Court found that defendants reasonably relied on Nath’s authority to sign the stipulation and plaintiff’s former criminal counsel’s authority to negotiate. Moreover, plaintiff waited four months before moving to vacate the stipulation, which the Court held constituted implicit ratification of the agreement.

Takeaways

This decision reinforces several core principles governing settlement stipulations in New York. First, an attorney of record who participates in settlement conferences is presumed to have at least apparent authority to enter into settlement agreements on behalf of a client, even absent express written authorization from the client. Second, unreasonable delay in moving to vacate a settlement agreement can be construed as implicit ratification, undermining a party’s claim that they never authorized the deal.

Practitioners should note that using intermediaries in settlement discussions—such as former attorneys who relay offers—does not negate a counsel-of-record’s authority to finalize agreements. Clients who believe their attorneys have exceeded settlement authority must act quickly and decisively to challenge any resulting stipulations.

Why It Matters

This opinion is significant for civil litigators because it clarifies the boundaries of attorney settlement authority in a multi-attorney scenario. Where a counsel-of-record participates in conferences and signs a stipulation, courts will hold that party bound even if the actual settlement terms were communicated through another attorney. The four-month delay in challenging the settlement was fatal here, illustrating how courts treat silence and inaction as consent. Attorneys handling settlement negotiations should ensure clients understand and authorize the terms before any stipulation is signed, and clients who dispute settlement authority must move to vacate without delay to preserve their claims.

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