Royster v. City of New York

Court
New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department
Case
Royster v. City of New York
Date
June 4, 2026
Slip Op. No.
2026 NY Slip Op 03516

Background

Plaintiff Frederick Royster was riding a motorcycle that police officers believed to be a “dirt bike” being operated without a helmet and onto a pedestrian walkway. Officers in a patrol car pursued plaintiff, who eventually lost control of the motorcycle on grass and fell. The patrol car was approximately two car lengths behind plaintiff at the time of the accident and was proceeding slowly on the pedestrian walkway. Plaintiff sued the City of New York and individual officers for negligence.

Defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, asserting the affirmative defense that the officers were operating an authorized emergency vehicle involved in an emergency operation under Vehicle and Traffic Law Section 1104. Supreme Court, Bronx County (Mitchell J. Danziger, J.), granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff also moved for a declaratory judgment that he was not precluded from soliciting testimony from a particular nonparty witness. The court denied that motion as moot. Plaintiff appealed both orders.

Holding

The Appellate Division, First Department, unanimously affirmed both orders, without costs. On the summary judgment ruling, the Court applied the recently clarified standard from Granath v. Monroe County, 2026 NY Slip Op 01586, *3 (2026), holding that defendants properly invoked the Vehicle and Traffic Law Section 1104 emergency operation defense.

The Court rejected plaintiff’s argument that defendants waived the affirmative defense by failing to specifically plead they were engaged in an emergency operation, finding the pleading sufficiently invoked the statute. The Court also held that the defense applied even without lights and sirens activated, citing VTL Section 1104(c) and Seo v. City of New York, 226 AD3d 413, 414 (1st Dept 2024). The officers were engaged in an emergency operation by pursuing a motorcycle they believed was being unlawfully operated.

Plaintiff failed to present evidence raising an issue of fact that the officers displayed “conscious indifference to the outcome.” Additionally, the Court found the officers’ conduct was not a proximate cause of the accident because plaintiff could have pulled over at any time, relying on Schieren v. State of New York, 281 AD2d 828, 831-832 (3d Dept 2001).

On the declaratory judgment motion, the Court held that the denial as moot was proper because the trial court had considered the witness’s statements and found they would not have changed the outcome.

Takeaways

This decision provides important guidance on the scope of the emergency operation defense under VTL Section 1104. The Court confirms that police need not activate emergency lights or sirens for the defense to apply, so long as they are engaged in a qualifying emergency operation. Pursuit of a suspect vehicle constitutes an emergency operation even at low speed on a pedestrian walkway. Plaintiffs challenging the defense must demonstrate that officers acted with “conscious indifference,” a high threshold that requires more than simply showing a pursuit occurred.

Why It Matters

This case applies the Court of Appeals’ recent Granath framework to a police pursuit scenario, reinforcing the breadth of municipal immunity when officers are engaged in authorized emergency operations. The decision is particularly notable for its holding on proximate cause—that a fleeing motorcyclist who could have stopped at any time cannot blame the pursuing officer for the resulting accident. Practitioners handling police pursuit cases should carefully evaluate whether the VTL Section 1104 defense applies and whether the plaintiff can meet the heightened standard of conscious indifference required to overcome it.

Leave a Comment

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Scroll to Top