- Court
- New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department
- Case Name
- Ziobro v. Milan House Inc.
- Slip Op. No.
- 2026 NY Slip Op 03281
- Decision Date
- May 26, 2026
- Docket No.
- Index No. 154028/17, Appeal No. 6728, Case No. 2025-02611
Background
Witold Ziobro and other plaintiffs brought a construction accident case against Milan House Inc. and Brown Harris Stevens Residential Management LLC under Labor Law Sections 200 and 241(6) and common-law negligence. Ziobro was injured while he and two coworkers were transporting bags of debris from a basement apartment undergoing renovation. The workers formed a line on approximately 10 stairs leading to the street level and were handing off debris bags between them. Ziobro was positioned in the middle of the stairway when he slipped on an accumulation of debris that had fallen from torn bags.
Ziobro asserted his Labor Law Section 241(6) claim was predicated on Industrial Code (12 NYCRR) Sections 23-1.7(d) (slipping hazards), 23-1.7(e)(1) (tripping and other hazards in passageways), and 23-1.7(e)(2) (tripping and other hazards in work areas). Defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing all claims. Supreme Court (Chan, J.) granted the motion in its entirety. Plaintiffs appealed.
Holding
The First Department unanimously modified the order, denying defendants’ motion as to the Labor Law Section 241(6) claim predicated on Industrial Code Sections 23-1.7(e)(1) and (e)(2), while affirming dismissal of the Section 241(6) claim based on Section 23-1.7(d) and the Labor Law Section 200 and common-law negligence claims.
The court held that the basement stairwell constituted a “passageway” under Industrial Code Sections 23-1.7(d) and (e)(1) because the plaintiff was required to use the stairs to access the apartment where renovation work was underway. Because the plaintiff was also standing on the stairs to work with his coworkers, the location qualified as a “work area” under Section 23-1.7(e)(2).
Critically, the court found that defendants failed to establish the debris on the stairs was “integral” to the work. The record showed the torn bags could not support their contents and workers did not clean the debris because they were rushing to complete the work while a truck waited on the street. Issues of fact remained as to whether the manner of debris transport created an avoidable danger and whether alternative methods could have been used. The accumulation of debris from torn bags was not an inherent result of ongoing demolition work.
However, the Section 23-1.7(d) claim was properly dismissed because that provision relates to slipping hazards such as foreign substances, and the debris was not a “substance” within its meaning. The Labor Law Section 200 and common-law negligence claims were also properly dismissed because the accident arose from the means and methods of the debris removal work performed by the plaintiff’s employer, and the building owner’s general oversight did not constitute supervisory control.
Key Takeaways
- A stairwell used to access a work area qualifies as both a “passageway” under Industrial Code Section 23-1.7(e)(1) and, when workers use it for performing tasks, a “work area” under Section 23-1.7(e)(2).
- The “integral to the work” defense does not apply where debris accumulation results from defective containers (torn bags) and workers’ failure to clean the area, rather than from the inherent nature of the demolition work itself.
- Rushing to complete work does not excuse the failure to maintain safe conditions in passageways and work areas.
- Industrial Code Section 23-1.7(d), covering slipping hazards, applies to foreign substances and does not encompass construction debris.
- The means-and-methods analysis under Labor Law Section 200 remains distinct from the Section 241(6) analysis; dismissal under one does not necessarily compel dismissal under the other.
Why It Matters
This decision provides important clarification on the scope of Industrial Code protections for workers in construction and renovation settings. The ruling distinguishes between debris that is inherent to demolition work and debris that results from defective containment and time pressure, holding that the latter does not qualify for the “integral to the work” defense. The case also illustrates that a single location can simultaneously qualify as both a passageway and a work area, potentially triggering multiple Industrial Code protections. Construction law practitioners should note that the court’s analysis allows Section 241(6) claims to survive even when Section 200 claims are dismissed, reinforcing the distinct analytical frameworks governing these closely related but separate statutory provisions.