U.S. Bank v. Pursoo — Fifteen-year service delay defeats foreclosure
The Second Department upheld dismissal of a mortgage foreclosure after the lender waited roughly 15 years to seek more time for service and offered no excuse for the delay.
The Second Department upheld dismissal of a mortgage foreclosure after the lender waited roughly 15 years to seek more time for service and offered no excuse for the delay.
The South Carolina Court of Appeals held that Mastercard performs income-producing activity in the state when its network enables transactions at South Carolina merchants and upheld assessments and failure-to-file penalties.
The First Department held that Euroclear account statements authorized beneficial owners to sue on defaulted notes and that conflicting Chinese law did not excuse payment under a New York-law indenture.
The Second Department held that a lender’s voluntary discontinuance did not reset an accelerated mortgage debt’s limitations period under the Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act.
The First Department held that a lender employee’s detailed testimony about an agent’s mailing system and incorporated records established compliance with RPAPL 1304.
The Second Department held reverse-mortgage owners equitably estopped from asserting limitations where repeated occupancy certifications caused the lender’s delay.
The First Department held a 2019 foreclosure time-barred because a legally defective 2008 action still accelerated the debt and CPLR savings provisions did not apply.
The First Department reinstated multiple RMBS trustee claims involving disclosed servicing failures, repurchase enforcement, mortgage-file defects, and contractual standing.
A federal judge dismissed mortgage-servicing claims with prejudice because prior bankruptcy findings foreclosed the core allegations and the borrower could not plead RESPA damages.
The First Department rejected a $525,000 note based only on past consideration while confirming a partner’s right to an accounting upon dissolution.
The Second Department held that a lender’s second foreclosure action, filed without leave, discontinued its earlier action by operation of RPAPL 1301(3), preventing later restoration.
The Second Department applied New York’s Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act to hold that a voluntary discontinuance did not reset the six-year limitations period after mortgage acceleration.
The Second Department vacated a commercial foreclosure judgment because a bank officer’s affidavit neither showed personal knowledge of default nor identified and attached the business records on which it relied.
The First Department held that a tenant’s nominal five-year extension did not cure a commercial mortgage cash sweep because an at-will termination option could end the lease after 13 months.
The First Department vacated a $9.2 million judgment because the movant’s affirmation omitted CPLR 2106’s required New York perjury language and the evidence did not show the defendant participated in fraudulent transfers.
Authorized partial payments may restart California’s six-year limitations period for enforcing a promissory note, creating a triable issue here.
The Ninth Circuit held that a prior bankruptcy ruling barred a homeowner from relitigating mortgage-payment and deed-of-trust issues in a later foreclosure suit.
A district court affirmed denial of contempt sanctions because a secured lender had an objectively reasonable basis to believe its lien enforcement survived the debtor’s discharge.
John Arthur Shepardson appealed pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his action alleging federal and state law claims arising from collection of a balloon payment loan. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that Shepardson failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to
The Ninth Circuit held that a Nevada HOA foreclosure based only on fines and related costs did not extinguish Wells Fargo’s senior deed of trust.
The First Department largely preserved UBS’s turnover claims over alleged asset stripping that frustrated more than $1 billion in New York judgments.
The court dismissed the FCRA claim with prejudice. It held that the pleaded authorization supplied a permissible purpose, and the later dispute allegations did not plausibly show that Credit Karma used the reports outside the monitoring and information services Reyna had authorized.
The district court reversed dismissal of the first claim and allowed the objection to Nationstar’s proof of claim to proceed. Reading the self-represented debtor’s allegations liberally, it concluded that asserted discrepancies in the claimed amount deserved an opportunity for factual de
A Northern District court dismissed credit-reporting claims because the plaintiff did not connect the alleged inaccuracy to a concrete personal injury.