The Supreme Court held that the complaint adequately pleaded claims for breach of contract, fraud, violation of North Carolina’s Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and defamation under the state’s notice-pleading standard. It affirmed dismissal of negligent misrepresentation, dismissed review of remaining issues as improvidently allowed, and remanded the revived claims.
The Massachusetts Appeals Court affirmed MCRA and defamation verdicts against neighboring property owners who mounted a campaign of threats and false statements against a cannabis retailer’s permit and property rights, holding that the absolute litigation privilege did not shield demands and defamatory statements made in private meetings and community settings unrelated to the defendants’ pending Land Court lawsuits. The civil conspiracy judgment was reversed because the underlying “extortion” theory was tied to a c. 93A claim on which the defendants had prevailed; extortion is not a freestanding civil tort in Massachusetts. The $178,743.25 MCRA attorney’s fee award was affirmed as timely and reasonable; fee petitions under civil rights statutes are not subject to the Rule 59(e) deadline and need not be proportionate to damages.
The First Department applies the law of the case doctrine to bar a pro se defamation defendant from asserting privilege on a second summary judgment motion, where he had deliberately withheld the defense in the first motion and the prior appellate decision found his statements went to a ‘nonprivileged party.’
The Texas Court of Appeals, Ninth District, affirmed the TCPA dismissal of defamation and malicious prosecution claims where the plaintiff attached no evidence—no affidavits, no documents—to his response to the anti-SLAPP motion, holding that attorney argument alone does not satisfy the “clear and specific evidence” standard required to defeat a TCPA motion to dismiss.
The Thirteenth Court of Appeals reversed the denial of Baseline Energy’s TCPA motion to dismiss a libel claim based on statements made to the Texas Workforce Commission, holding that TWC communications implicate the right to petition and that an employee’s failure to present any evidence in response to the motion required dismissal of the libel claim.