The Court of Appeals found no error. The trial evidence supported an inference that Spencer knew the store and employee schedules, positioned himself for a private attack, and waited for the victims to leave. Evidence that he changed clothes, misled his girlfriend, and disposed of the weapon supported flight even though he later appeared near officers. The evidence also did not require a second-degree murder instruction.
The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial. Allowing thirteen jurors to deliberate violated both the governing statute and the North Carolina Constitution’s twelve-juror guarantee. The judge’s mixed instruction to restart but await directions to continue or begin was not the clear, unequivocal safeguard the law requires. The error was both structural in character and prejudicial, so the court did not reach the sentencing issue.
The Court of Appeals found no error. Counsel did not concede guilt to the Pender County charges; the argument attempted to connect incriminating statements to different allegations and focus the jury on the State’s burden. The on-record discussion showed Benson knowingly accepted that strategy. The court also held that the substantial evidence of guilt defeated any showing of Strickland prejudice.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of Rule 60 relief. The trial court investigated the circumstances, assessed credibility, considered the available Rule 60 grounds, and could find that the record did not establish a void judgment or extraordinary circumstances. The appellate court emphasized its deferential abuse-of-discretion review and declined to substitute its credibility judgment for the trial court’s.
The Court of Appeals reversed. Although evidence supported some findings about the witnesses’ conduct, the supported findings did not show a flagrant constitutional violation that irreparably prejudiced Cuadra’s preparation of his defense with no available remedy other than dismissal. The case was remanded for further proceedings that may include a new trial; a concurrence emphasized the availability of lesser sanctions such as a mistrial.
The published panel reversed and ordered enforcement of the agreed Michigan forum. Because the subcontract involved interstate commerce, the Federal Arbitration Act applied and preempted North Carolina’s contrary forum restriction. General equitable concerns and efficiency could not override the FAA’s command that arbitration agreements be enforced according to their terms.
The published opinion remanded for the trial court to determine whether counsel performed deficiently and, if so, whether those deficiencies deprived the mother of a fair hearing. The existing appellate record did not permit the Court of Appeals to resolve the fact-sensitive ineffective-assistance questions itself. A separate concurrence elaborated on the standards the trial court should use on remand.
The Supreme Court held that the complaint adequately pleaded claims for breach of contract, fraud, violation of North Carolina’s Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and defamation under the state’s notice-pleading standard. It affirmed dismissal of negligent misrepresentation, dismissed review of remaining issues as improvidently allowed, and remanded the revived claims.
The Supreme Court reversed on both points. Even assuming portions of the expert testimony crossed the line, Wingate could not show plain error—that the jury probably would have reached a different result without it. The indictment’s factual allegations and the circumstances gave adequate notice despite the incorrect statutory citation.
The Supreme Court modified and affirmed. Under the facts and statutory text, Williams remained a lawful occupant for purposes of N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2 even after exiting the vehicle during the confrontation. He was entitled to the presumption instruction, and the failure to give it was prejudicial.
Applying State v. Chambers, the Supreme Court rejected a case-by-case constitutional test. The statute is constitutional when its two safeguards are observed: the alternate must not have discussed the case and the reconstituted jury must begin deliberations anew. The Court reversed on substitution, held the suppression issue unpreserved, and remanded for remaining issues.
The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals failed to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Occupancy, proximity, control of the premises, and Norris’s suspicious movement together supplied incriminating circumstances from which a jury could find constructive possession. The Court reversed and remanded for consideration of remaining appellate issues.
The Supreme Court reversed. Although restraint inherent and inevitable in another felony cannot independently support kidnapping, the State presented evidence of extensive additional bindings beyond what the suffocation murder required. Those restraints permitted the jury to find a separate kidnapping and supported reinstatement of that judgment.
The Supreme Court reversed and concluded that McGirt knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived counsel. The written requests, extended history with appointed counsel, and trial court’s questioning showed an unequivocal choice and awareness of the consequences. Because waiver resolved the appeal, the majority did not need to decide forfeiture by misconduct.
The Supreme Court affirmed the grant of certiorari and held that the discretionary framework stated in Cryan applies to all petitions, including criminal matters. Extraordinary circumstances may justify issuance, although obtaining the writ does not predict success on the merits. The reviewing court’s decision is tested for an abuse of discretion.
The Supreme Court held that successive petitions to terminate registration are parts of the same underlying case. The unappealed 2019 tier ruling therefore became law of the case and foreclosed relitigation in the later petition. The Court modified and affirmed without reaching the remaining statutory analysis.
The Supreme Court affirmed. Because the record available during the direct appeal was adequate to litigate the asserted deficiencies and prejudice, Gupton was in a position to raise the claims then. His later motion could therefore be rejected under N.C.G.S. § 15A-1419 rather than decided through a new evidentiary proceeding.
The Supreme Court held that the Habitual Felon Act does not prohibit filing the status indictment before the principal-felony indictment. It rejected relief on that ground. On the vehicle count, the Court found insufficient evidence of using the car to keep drugs over time but remanded for consideration of the alternative allegation that it was maintained to sell drugs.
The Supreme Court narrowed the reach of the per se-prejudice rule associated with State v. Harbison. Reading Florida v. Nixon, Strickland, and Cronic together, it held that most claims based on an unconsented concession require proof of deficient performance and prejudice; automatic prejudice is reserved for circumstances in which the defendant is entirely surprised by counsel’s concession. It reversed the remand for an evidentiary hearing.
The Supreme Court distinguished marketable enterprise goodwill, which remains with a practice, from personal goodwill that depends on the individual practitioner. It held that personal goodwill cannot qualify as marital property and reversed to that extent. Review of the enterprise-goodwill issue was dismissed as improvidently allowed, and the matter was remanded for a corrected distribution order.
The Supreme Court held that a Rule 30(b)(6) deponent does not have to obtain a protective order before the deposition to preserve objections to noticed topics. It also held that the trial court could not require defendants to create new English-language versions of documents already produced in Japanese. The Court reversed in relevant part, directed that the discovery order be vacated, and remanded for a fresh application of the governing rules.
The Supreme Court held that the pleaded facts were sufficient to proceed on a narrow constitutional theory: a school board may not be deliberately indifferent to extreme in-school conduct that deprives a student of equal access to a sound basic education. The Court also found immediate appellate jurisdiction based on the risk of inconsistent verdicts, reversed the contrary ruling, and remanded.
The Supreme Court answered a question of first impression and held that the revocable trust did not have to be joined. Because every settlor was already a party, a judgment concerning the trust property effectively bound the trust without impairing another person’s rights. The Court modified and affirmed the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals held that the Estate presented sufficient evidence of a confidential or fiduciary relationship and the resulting benefit needed for constructive fraud. O’Neil’s vulnerability, Lynch’s assistance and influence, and the scale and use of the withdrawals allowed a reasonable jury to find the required relationship and abuse. The court therefore left the jury’s verdict intact rather than reweighing com