The Utah Supreme Court held that compulsion is an excuse, not a legal justification, and therefore cannot support the murder statute’s special-mitigation defense.
The Massachusetts SJC ordered a new murder trial because excluding postarrest psychiatric records stripped the defendant’s criminal-responsibility defense of its medical foundation.
The Massachusetts Appeals Court reversed a District Court civil commitment order after finding that the commitment petition was facially invalid: the same one-page petition identified the signatory, Michael Tarmey, with two contradictory titles—“Medical Director” in the title block and “Vice President, Associate Chief Nursing Officer” in the signature block—while companion documents in the same proceeding identified a different person as “Medical Director.” The court held that the ordinary presumption that a hearing judge may rely on the petition’s face to establish the signatory’s authority under G.L. c. 123, §§ 1 and 7(a) does not apply when the petition itself is internally contradictory; the judge must then resolve the factual question on the evidence, and here the record was insufficient to do so.
The Massachusetts Appeals Court affirmed the civil commitment of A.H.—diagnosed with intermittent explosive disorder (IED)—holding that IED can qualify as a “mental illness” under 104 Code Mass. Regs. § 27.05(1), the DMH regulation governing involuntary civil commitment under G.L. c. 123, §§ 7 and 8, even though IED is not classified as a “mood disorder” by the DSM-5. The court held that DSM-5 categorical classifications inform but do not bind the hearing judge; a diagnosis that manifests in a specific patient as a substantial disorder of mood that grossly impairs judgment and daily functioning satisfies the regulation regardless of its DSM-5 category label. Both experts had agreed A.H. was dangerous and that no less restrictive alternative placement was available.